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INTRODUCTION

Commercial law reform is rarely revolutionary and rarely makes
headlines.' Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") is very much in that tradition of incrementalism. Although
the revision rewrites Article 9 in its entirety, it effects no revolution.
Nor is it driven by a single guiding theme. Rather, it makes a vast
number of relatively modest and more or less unrelated revisions to

Former Article 9. Many of the revisions implement recommendations
made in the 1992 report by the study group on Article 9 appointed by
the UCC's Permanent Editorial Board.2 But the drafting committee's
mandate was not defined by the study group's recommendations, and
so the drafting committee could and did make whatever revisions
seemed good to it.

So it came to pass that Revised Article 9 includes revisions
addressed to a subject not heralded by the study group report:
namely, a secured party's repledge of the debtor's collateral to secure

the secured party's own obligation to a third party. These revisions
appear in two cryptic provisions, Revised 9-207(c)(3) and 9-314(c),
which are decrypted to some extent by lengthy Comments.
Observe that the term "repledge" refers to a pledge of the
debtor's collateral by the secured party, to secure the secured party's
own obligation to a third person. This is not to be confused with the

more familiar situation in which the debtor grants a security interest
in the same property to two secured parties, securing obligations
which the debtor has to each. In defiance of etymology, repledge is
often referred to as "rehypothecation." 3 It is increasingly common1. Which may be just as well. Thus, the New York Times greeted the original UCC with
the deflating headline Commercial Code is Held Defective. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1956, at 35
(alluding to the report of the New York Law Revision Commission on the 1952 Official Draft).
Still, the UCC is not without its fans among the wider public. For example, many news stories
have noted its popularity among members of "anti-government militia groups," who believe
only in "Magna Charta, the Bible and the Uniform Commercial Code." Militias Target Local
Officials, S.F. HERALD EXAM'R, Mar. 31, 1997, at A-1. Given the proclivity of such groups for
filing bogus financing statements against their enemies, a cynic who observes that Revised
Article 9 abolishes the requirement that a financing statement be signed by the debtor, see
Revised 9-502, and who is ignorant of the good reasons for that change, might be tempted to
speculate that the change is in the nature of a reward to a favored interest group in grateful
recognition of faithful support. But cf. R. §§ 9-509(a), 9-625(e)(3) (prohibiting unauthorized
filings and imposing sanctions for violation of the prohibition).
2. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB
STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9: REPORT (Dec. 1, 1992).
3. "Hypothecation" derives from hypotheca, a term used in Roman law to denote a
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though even less justified-to use the term "rehypothecation" to refer
to any pre-default use of collateral by the secured party, including
outright sale as well as repledge. 4 This paper avoids the term
"rehypothecation," less out of concern for linguistic purity than to
avoid the differing connotations it has acquired.
Repledge is not a new idea. The traditional setting for repledge
arises from so-called "margin lending" by stockbrokers: that is, the
making of a loan by the broker to its customer, representing a portion
of the cost of purchasing or carrying securities held by the broker for
the customer's account. Margin loans are typically secured by the
customer's pledge of those securities (often called "margin securities"
in this context) to the broker. Traditionally, few brokers have had the
wherewithal to make margin loans out of their own capital, so a
broker typically would finance its margin lending by obtaining its own
loan from a third party, commonly a bank, securing that loan by
repledge of its customers' margin securities. In that setting, repledge
has led a vigorous existence, evidenced by reported cases, for well
over a century. As we will see, pre-UCC common law allowed a
stockbroker to repledge a customer's margin securities, subject to
certain limitations, even without the customer's consent. The UCC
codified that common-law right in Former 9-207(2)(e).' Revised
Article 9 carries forward that right, with the common-law limitations
removed, in Revised 9-207(c)(3). Repledges of securities are
commonplace today, though repledges of other types of collateral
seem to be all but unheard of.
Yet repledge has always been treated by successive drafters of
the UCC as an ugly and unloved foundling, attended to only after
more favored children have been tucked in for the night. The right of
repledge did not appear at all in the original 1952 version of the UCC,
security device in which the pledgor retains possession of the collateral. See John H. Wigmore,
The Pledge-Idea:A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas (pt. 3), 11 HARV. L. REV. 18, 24, 30-31
(1897). It is therefore inappropriate to use "hypothecate" as a synonym for pledge, or
"rehypothecate" as a synonym for repledge. However, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (6th
ed. 1990) so defines the term "rehypothecate," and in apparent deference to this common usage
the term is used in that sense (in quotation marks) in section 8-504, Comment 2. A closer
modern analogue to hypotheca would be the so-called "agreement to pledge," in which a broker
grants a security interest in securities without delivery of possession or control. See R.
§ 9-309(10) & cmt. 6 (using the term "hypothecation" to refer to such transactions).
4. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS'N, ISDA GUIDELINES FOR

COLLATERAL PRACTITIONERS 28 (1998); Christian J. Johnson, Derivatives and
Rehypothecation Failure: It's 3:00 P.M., Do You Know Where Your Collateral Is?, 39 ARIZ. L.
REv. 949, 951 (1997).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 19-21.
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but rather was added as an afterthought in 1953.6 In the
comprehensive 1994 revision of Article 8, the right of repledge set
forth in Former 9-207(2)(e) was not amended, but that provision must
be read with artistic license to operate sensibly under Article 8 as
revised. 7 Most recently, the provision which reflects the most
noteworthy feature of Revised Article 9's theory of repledge, Revised

9-314(c)(2), made its debut in the March 1998 draft, at the very end of
the revision process.
It is understandable why repledge has never been high on the
agenda of any UCC drafting team. In the first place, in the traditional
setting for repledge - that is, the financing by stockbrokers of margin
loans to their customers-the state law of pledge was largely
displaced by federal laws before the UCC was written. In particular,

the property rights of margin customers in margin securities, which
historically were crucial to determining how the broker's assets would
6. Compare U.C.C. § 9-207 (Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition, 1952), reprinted
in 15 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFrs 226 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984)
[hereinafter UCC DRAFS] (no mention of repledge) with Recommendations of the Editorial
Board for Changes in the Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code Official Draft,
Text and Comments Edition (Apr. 20, 1953), reprinted in 15 UCC DRAFTS, supra, at 413
(recommending addition of repledge language similar to that in the 1995 Official Text, together
with a Comment relating thereto); U.C.C. § 9-207 (Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition,
1952, and with Changes and Modifications Approved by the Enlarged Editorial Board at
Meetings Held on Dec. 29, 1952; Feb. 16, 1953; May 21, 1953; and Dec. 11, 1953), reprintedin 17
UCC DRAFTS, supra, at 226-27 (implementing the foregoing recommendation); U.C.C. § 9-207
(1957 Official Text with Comments), reprinted in 20 UCC DRAFTS, supra, at 163-64 (carrying
forward the repledge language in the statutory text, but deleting the Comment relating thereto
without explanation); and U.C.C. § 9-207 (1958 Official Text), reprinted in 21 UCC DRAFTS,
supra, at 418 (reorganizing section 9-207 and Comments thereto to the form they would retain
until the 1999 Official Text, without substantive change to the repledge language).
7. Former 9-207 by its terms applies only to collateral in the secured party's "possession,"
and hence does not literally apply to securities held through a securities intermediary or to
uncertificated securities. The version of Article 8 in force between 1977 and 1994 contained a
separate provision stating that the rights and duties set forth in Former 9-207 apply "to the
extent they are applicable" to such nonpossessory securities collateral. See U.C.C. § 8-321(3)(b)
(1978 Official Text). The 1994 revision of Article 8 deleted that provision without otherwise
covering the subject. That omission was patently a drafting glitch. One way to circumvent it
would be to construe broadly the term "possession"; another would be to apply the rules of
Former 9-207 as a supplemental principle of law pursuant to section 1-103. Revised Article 9
fixes this glitch as to the right of repledge, in that Revised 9-207(c), which sets forth the right of
repledge, now applies to collateral in the secured party's "control" as well as "possession."
Curiously, a reference to "control" was not added elsewhere in Revised 9-207. Thus, for
example, the basic duty to exercise reasonable care in the custody of collateral, set forth in
Revised 9-207(a), literally applies only to collateral in the secured party's "possession." This
appears to be a continuation of the same drafting glitch, as it seems unreasonable to suppose
that the drafters intended that a secured party have no duty of care in any circumstances as to
nonpossessory collateral. To take an extreme example, consider a secured party who knowingly
and recklessly holds the securities collateral at a financially shaky intermediary which fails,
occasioning loss.
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be distributed if the broker went bankrupt, were made all but

irrelevant by the enactment in 1938 of section 60e of the then-current
Bankruptcy Act. 8 The basic idea embodied in section 60e, though

recodified and altered in many details, continues to be the foundation
of the distributional schemes applicable to customers of an insolvent
stockbroker under today's law, as set forth in the Securities Investor

Protection Act ("SIPA") 9 and the Bankruptcy Code. 10 Furthermore,
since 1940, rules issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") have strictly regulated repledges of customer securities by
stockbrokers."
In the second place, there has been virtually no meaningful case
law on repledge, and very little scholarly commentary, since the UCC
was promulgated. 2 That too is a consequence of repledge historically
having been a tool used almost exclusively by stockbrokers. As a
practical matter the legal issues arising from a repledge by a

stockbroker-or for that matter any repledge by any securities
intermediary- are likely to be litigated only if the intermediary
becomes insolvent. If the intermediary is solvent and hence able to

produce the customer's securities on demand, many customers may
not know or care what the intermediary does with the securities in the
meantime, and any customer who does know, care, and object is apt

simply to move her securities to a different intermediary. 3 Until the
8. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 60e, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 96(e) (1976))
(repealed effective 1979). See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New
Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 352-64 (1990).
9. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636 (as
amended, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (1994)).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1994) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code]. The provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code relating to stockbroker liquidation are contained in subchapter III of chapter
7, 11 U.S.C. §§ 741-752. On stockbroker liquidations under SIPA and subchapter III generally,
see Michael E. Don & Josephine Wang, Stockbroker Liquidations Under the Securities Investor
ProtectionAct and Their Impact on Securities Transfers,12 CARDoZO L. REv. 509 (1990).
11. Rules 8c-1, 15c-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.8c-1, 240.15c2-1 (1998). Government securities
dealers are subject to parallel regulations. See 17 C.F.R. § 403.2 (1998). The SEC recently
authorized the creation of a new class of limited-purpose broker-dealer, designed to engage
primarily in over-the-counter derivatives transactions. Repledges by such entities generally are
exempt from the ordinary limitations of Rules 8c-1 and 15c-2. See OTC Derivatives Dealers, 63
Fed. Reg. 59,362 (Nov. 3, 1998).
12. The only sustained scholarly treatments appear to be 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 42.10, at 1155-60 (1965), and Johnson, supra note 4.
13. For rare exceptions, see Bronner v. Goldman, 236 F. Supp. 713, 719 (D. Mass. 1964),
affd, 361 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1966) (customer of failed securities firm unsuccessfully sued her
lender on several theories, including wrongful repledge), and Schreiber Family Charitable
Found. v. First Fin. Acceptance Co., 965 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (repledge of securities
held not to violate agreement by the secured party not to encumber the securities; court
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1930s the case reports were swollen with stockbroker bankruptcies,
but since then insolvencies of securities intermediaries have become
much less common, and insolvencies in which the intermediary has a
shortfall of securities (or at least a shortfall for which the customer is
not covered by insurance) are rare. Happy is the country with no
history, and (so harried law revisers quite reasonably may conclude)
happy is the niche of commercial law in which next to no reported
cases arise.
But new transactional patterns have arisen. The broker's
repledge of margin securities, though still extant, is old hat. A hightech variant has evolved and spread with mutagenic speed during the
last decade or so. This new transactional pattern arises out of a genre
of sophisticated bilateral transactions referred to as "over-the-counter
derivatives," or "OTC derivatives" for short. An OTC derivative
transaction typically imposes upon one party, or both, an obligation
to make one or more payments to the other party over time, the
amount of each payment (and the identity of the party obliged to
make the payment) being determined by a formula based on an
external index, such as prevailing interest rates or commodity prices.
Since at least the late 1980s it has been common for such transactions
to provide that the net present value of the parties' respective future
obligations under the transaction must be determined periodically,
and that the party who is the net obligor must then provide credit
support to secure its obligations under the transaction. Such credit
support frequently takes the form of a pledge of U.S. Treasury or
other marketable securities. If, as is typically the case, one party is a
dealer in derivative transactions, it often will enter into an offsetting
transaction with a third party, and the dealer will wish to have the
right to repledge any collateral it receives under one of these two
transactions in order to secure its own obligations under the other
transaction. Hence the standard form of security documentation used
in the United States for OTC derivative transactions, written by a
trade association dominated by dealers, gives the secured party
unfettered power to repledge the collateral. Indeed, the
documentation goes further and also gives the secured party
reasoned that the secured party might have retrieved the repledged securities by pledging
substitute collateral of its own). Schreiber seems flagrantly wrong, and is explicable only on the
supposition that the court had little patience with the suit because the secured party was in fact
solvent. See BARKLEY CLARK, LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE I

7.15[d] (Supp. 1998).
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unfettered power to sell the collateral outright before default. If the
secured party repledges or sells the collateral, the documentation
allows the secured party to retain the proceeds for its own use, and it
need not apply them to the pledgor's obligation, hold them separately
as collateral, remit them to the pledgor, or otherwise account for
them. Rather, the secured party's only duty is to return equivalent
14
securities at the end of the deal.
The same liberal attitude toward use of pledged securities by the
secured party prevails in other capital market transactions. For
example, in a securities lending transaction, the borrower typically
secures its obligation to return a "borrowed" security by pledging to
the lender U.S. Treasury or other marketable securities. Standard
documentation for these transactions likewise allows some lenders to
repledge, sell, or otherwise dispose of that collateral without
accounting for the proceeds.15
So, after a sixty year hiatus, the commercial law of repledge
matters again. The purpose of this paper is to summarize briefly how
Revised Article 9 deals with repledge and its close kin, the pre-default
sale of collateral. Limitations of space preclude exploration of
important related topics, such as the common law that was applied to
stockbrokers' repledges of their customers' margin securities in the
early decades of this century, and the complex and doubtful nature of
the property right of a pledgor of securities held through an
intermediary under Article 8.
This paper focuses on repledge of securities, and it assumes that
the reader is familiar with the provisions of the UCC dealing with the
holding and transfer of securities. These are set forth principally in
Article 8, with related changes to Article 9, as revised in 1994.
Revised Article 9 carries forward the 1994 provisions with only minor

14. Paragraph 6(c) of the 1994 ISDA Credit Support Annex ("Bilateral Form-ISDA
Agreements Subject to New York Law Only"), drafted by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, Inc. (formerly named the "International Swap Dealers Association,
Inc.") states that, in general,
the Secured Party will, notwithstanding Section 9-207 of the New York Uniform
Commercial Code, have the right to ... sell, pledge, assign, invest, use, commingle or
otherwise dispose of, or otherwise use in its business any Posted Collateral it holds,
free from any claim or right of any nature whatsoever of the Pledgor, including any
equity or right of redemption by the Pledgor.
15. Section 3.2 of the Master Securities Loan Agreement (May 1993), drafted by The Bond
Market Association, states in part that, if the lender is a broker-dealer, the lender "may pledge,
repledge, hypothecate, rehypothecate, lend, relend, sell or otherwise transfer the
Collateral...."
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substantive changes.16 Furthermore, this paper deals with securities

held and transferred through securities intermediaries, dealt with
principally in Part 5 of Article 8, often referred to as the "indirect
holding system." This is to be contrasted with the traditional "direct

holding system," in which the beneficial owner of a security holds the
security directly, with ownership typically evidenced by a possession
of a certificate and transfer effected by physical delivery of the
certificate. Because repledge transactions today would usually be
expected to involve securities held at a securities intermediary, this
paper assumes that setting unless otherwise indicated. In addition,
this paper does not address issues of federal law that might apply to
securities issued by the U.S. Treasury or government-sponsored
enterprises.7
Finally, a note on terminology. This can be confusing in repledge

transactions, which by their nature involve two transactions between
three parties, one of whom is playing the role of secured party in one

transaction and debtor in the other. In this paper, the original debtor
is referred to as the "Pledgor"; Pledgor pledges securities to "SP"; SP

then repledges (or, where indicated, sells) the securities to
"Transferee." Except where precision is important, this paper freely
uses colloquial language instead of the precise but dense terminology

of Articles 8 and 9 (e.g., "a customer holding securities in his account
at his custodian" rather than "an entitlement holder having a security

entitlement to financial assets credited to the securities account
16. For a summary of the differences between Revised Article 9 and the 1994 provisions,
see Robert A. Wittie, Review of Legislative Developments Affecting U.C.C. Article 8 and
Investment Securities, 53 Bus. LAW. 1511 (1998). The principal commentaries on the 1994
version of Article 8, beside its own Prefatory Note and Comments, are two items written by
James Steven Rogers, Reporter for the 1994 revisions: volume 7A and portions of volume 8 of
WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES (1998) [hereinafter
ROGERS], and James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 1431 (1996). See also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The
Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 291.
17. Securities issued by the U.S. Treasury and maintained on the books of the Federal
Reserve Banks are governed by the so-called "TRADES Regulations," 31 C.F.R. pt. 357 (1998).
Many government-sponsored enterprises have similar regulations. See Robert A. Wittie, Review
of Recent Developments in U.C.C. Article 8 and Investment Securities, 52 BUS. LAW. 1575, 1576
n.5 (1997). These regulations apply federal substantive law to most aspects of transactions
between Federal Reserve Banks and their participants, but defer to state law as to other aspects,
and as to all aspects of transactions on the books of lower-tier intermediaries. These regulations
further provide that, subject to certain exceptions, if the relevant state has not adopted Revised
Article 9 (for this purpose defined to mean the 1994 Official Text of Article 8, and related
conforming changes to Article 9 and other Articles), then that state will be deemed to have
done so for purposes of these regulations. Because Revised Article 9 changes the 1994 Official
Text, conforming changes to these regulations may be necessary. As of July 1999 the Treasury
had not taken a position on the subject.
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maintained by his securities intermediary").18
I. THE UNLIMITED STATUTORY RIGHT OF REPLEDGE AND THE

REDEFINITION OF "GOOD FAITH"
The text of Revised Article 9, like its predecessor, contains
exactly one express reference to repledge. That reference appears in
Revised 9-207, "Rights and Duties of Secured Party Having
Possession or Control of Collateral," a section which has the rare
honor of not having been renumbered from its predecessor.
Subsection (c)(3) of Revised 9-207 reads as follows:
(c) Duties and rights when secured party in possession or control.
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a secured
party having possession of collateral or control of collateral
under Section 9-104, 9-105, 9-106, or 9-107:
(3) may create a security interest in the collateral.
The "except as otherwise provided" clause in the preface never
applies to repledges of securities. So, under this provision, a secured
party having "possession" of a security certificate pledged to it, or
"control" of a security or security entitlement pledged to it (where
"control" is defined in the precise sense introduced in the 1994
revisions to Article 8), may create a security interest in that collateral,
without further ado, unless the secured party has agreed not to do so.
The secured party's right of repledge is markedly broader under
Revised Article 9 than under Former Article 9. Former 9-207(2)(e)
gave the secured party the right to repledge collateral only "upon
terms which do not impair the debtor's right to redeem it." This
codified the dominant rule under pre-UCC common law. Under that
common-law rule, SP could not repledge to secure a debt larger than
Pledgor's debt to SP, nor for a longer term than the term of Pledgor's
debt to SP.19 If SP repledges within those constraints, Pledgor has the
18. Among other things, in order to avoid mind-numbing repetition of the word "security,"
the word "pledge" is used as a synonym for "security interest" and "grant a security interest,"
without any connotation of physical possession. The Article 8 terms "securities account" and
"securities intermediary" are frequently clipped to "account" and "intermediary." A
colloquialism often used is to the effect that "a customer holds securities through a securities
intermediary." Under Article 8, a customer ("entitlement holder") does not "hold securities" at
all, but rather has a security entitlement at the intermediary. "Security agreement" herein refers
to the entire agreement between pledgor and secured party relating to the secured transaction.
Revised 9-102(a)(73) defines the term to mean only the portion of the agreement that creates or
provides for the security interest.
19. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY

§ 23

cmt. b (1941); CHARLES H. MEYER, THE LAW
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ability, if need be, to redeem its collateral by doing no more than
tendering payment of its debt directly to Transferee. Such a "nonimpairing" repledge does not expose Pledgor to the risk of the
creditworthiness of SP. However, Former 9-207(2)(e), like the
common-law rule before it and like its successor in Revised Article 9,
is merely a gap-filling provision, applicable only if the parties have
not otherwise agreed. Under the common-law rule codified by
Former 9-207(2)(e), it was universally recognized that Pledgor could
contractually grant SP a right to repledge on terms that do "impair"
Pledgor's right to redeem. 20 Indeed, since before the UCC was
adopted, brokers routinely have obtained unrestricted contractual
rights of repledge from their margin customers. That is because the
only practical way for a broker to repledge is to repledge many or all
of its customers' margin securities in a single block to secure a single
loan, a practice which does impair the ability of any one customer to
redeem and hence is not authorized by Former 9-207(2)(e). If SP does
make (rightfully or wrongfully) an "impairing" repledge to a
Transferee who is entitled to the benefit of the adverse claim cut-off
rules in Article 8, then Pledgor becomes subject to the risk of the
solvency of SP, because if SP becomes insolvent Pledgor will be
unable to recover its property from Transferee even if Pledgor pays
the full amount of the debt Pledgor owes to SP.21
The merits of the expanded right of repledge afforded by
Revised 9-207(c)(3) are debatable. As noted in Comment 5, a secured
party who intends to repledge normally obtains the pledgor's consent
anyway. So it might have been more logical to delete this gap-filling
provision entirely. Practices would not have been affected so long as
the text or Comments made clear that repledge is allowed to the
extent permitted by agreement. Moreover, a gap-filling rule that does
not put the pledgor at risk in the event of the secured party's
insolvency arguably would be more consonant with the usual norms
of a secured transaction.
The unlimited right of repledge afforded by Revised 9-207(c)(3)
may be less useful to a secured party than it first appears. Obviously
OF STOCK BROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES §§ 69-70 (1931 & Cum. Supp. 1936); see also R.
§ 9-207 cmt. 2.
20. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 12 cmt. c, 14, 42-44 (1941); MEYER, supra note 19,
§§ 69, 71, 106, 108 & n.6; 2 STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION
COMMISSION FOR 1955, at 2021, 2034-35, 2054 (1955).
21. See U.C.C. §§ 8-502, 8-503(e), 8-510 (adverse claim cut-off rules in the indirect holding
system); U.C.C. § 8-303 (adverse claim cut-off rule in the direct holding system).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1109

the secured party may not exercise that right if the security agreement
forbids it. In this connection, a secured party should consider whether
boilerplate imposing upon the secured party in general terms a duty
of safekeeping with respect to the collateral might be construed as
being inconsistent with repledge, unless the security agreement
specifically allows repledge. If the secured party is a securities
intermediary and is repledging securities that it has credited to a
securities account it maintains for the pledgor (as would be the case in
the traditional broker's repledge of margin securities), then Article 8
compels the secured party to obtain the pledgor's consent to the
repledge in any event. 22 The secured party must also procure the
pledgor's consent to the repledge to the extent required by other state
laws, or by the SEC, or by other regulations to which the secured
23
party may be subject.
Still, there is no question that the revision places a new burden
on pledgors. Under Former Article 9, as a practical matter the
secured party must negotiate contractual permission if it wants to be
able to repledge, given that the statutory right in Former Article 9 is
too limited to be of much practical use. The revision shifts onto the
pledgor the burden of negotiating a limitation on the secured party's
now-unlimited statutory right. A pledgor should also reflect on
whether it is now wise to allow its security agreement to contain
broad language giving the secured party "all rights provided to a
secured party by the UCC."
Unpleasant surprises may be in store for both parties during the
transition to Revised Article 9, but perhaps most notably for the
pledgor. If a security agreement that is silent about repledge remains
in effect after the effective date of Revised Article 9, the transitional
rules will allow the secured party to take advantage of the expanded
statutory right of repledge after the effective date.2 4 Unless the parties
22. See U.C.C. § 8-504(b).
23. Various state laws may prohibit or restrict repledge without the consent of Pledgor.
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 339-e (McKinney 1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.00 (McKinney
1999). EGON GuTrMAN, MODERN SECURITIES TRANSFERS 19.03(1)(c), at 19-26 n.107 (3rd
ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996) lists statutes and regulations in 26 states restricting repledge of customer
securities by brokers, some of which contain restrictions that cannot be satisfied merely by
customer consent. As applied to brokers, these state laws would appear to have been preempted
in whole or part by § 15(h)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C § 78o(h)(1) (1997), added by the
National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, § 103(a), Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (1996). Brokers who wish to repledge customer securities as a practical matter generally
must obtain customer consent as a result of the federal regulations noted supra note 11.
24. See R. § 9-702(a). Revised Article 9 is proposed to take effect in each enacting
jurisdiction on July 1, 2001. See R. § 9-701.
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had reason to focus on repledge, the security agreement may well be
silent on the subject. Hence it seems quite possible that, to the
surprise of the pledgor, a security agreement negotiated under
Former Article 9 that says nothing about repledge may allow the
secured party to repledge without limitation after the effective date of
Revised Article 9.
Transitional issues may arise for secured parties as well. For
instance, the SEC regulations relating to brokers' repledges forbid a
broker from repledging customer securities on terms that would allow
the broker's pledgee to, in turn, repledge the securities for a sum
greater than the customer debt owed to the broker. 25 Hence if an
existing security agreement between a broker and its pledgee does
not prohibit such further repledges by the pledgee, the broker may be
in violation of those regulations upon the effective date of Revised
Article 9.
More lasting issues arise from the fact that the statutory right of
repledge applies to any collateral, not just securities held through a
securities intermediary. So if Pledgor delivers to SP any collateral
having attributes of negotiability, SP may repledge it rightfully (unless
SP has agreed not to do so), and if SP does repledge it to Transferee
and then fails, Pledgor may be unable to recover it from Transferee
even if Transferee is well aware that Pledgor is its true owner. For
example, consider the case of Luckless Corporation, which borrows
$100 from Finance Company, secured by a pledge of all of the capital
stock of Sub, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Luckless. The stock, worth
by reasonable estimates at least $200, is evidenced by a certificate,
delivered to Finance Company at closing along with the customary
blank stock power. If Luckless has not been alert enough to limit
Finance Company's statutory right of repledge, Finance Company
could rightfully repledge the Sub stock to MegaLender (together, if it
chooses, with other pledged securities in Finance Company's loan
portfolio and proprietary assets of Finance Company) in order to
secure Finance Company's $10,000 debt to MegaLender. Luckless'
ownership interest would not be an "adverse claim," because the
repledge would be rightful, and so MegaLender would take the
pledged stock free of Luckless' ownership interest even if
MegaLender knew that Luckless was its owner. Hence if Finance
25. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-2690, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1940).

22,438 (Nov. 15,
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Company fails, Luckless may well lose the Sub stock, even if Luckless
repays the $100 it owes. The likelihood that security documentation
negotiated under Former Article 9 is silent or ambiguous about
repledge is probably greater in a commercial lending transaction such

as this than in the OTC derivatives market, in which participants have
long been mindful of the risks posed by repledge.
Revised Article 9 provides one possible basis for limiting the

facially-unlimited statutory right of repledge in some circumstances.
That is the general duty of good faith in the performance and

enforcement of every contract and duty within the UCC, imposed by
section 1-203. The revision does not directly amend that section. But
the revision follows the trend of other Articles and expands the

definition of "good faith" to require not merely subjective "honesty in
fact," but also compliance with an objective standard, namely
"observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. ' 26 As
a result, a Pledgor might argue that exercise by SP of the statutory
right of repledge (or, for that matter, even a contractual right of

repledge) might be wrongful in a particular case because it violates
"reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." If Transferee were
sufficiently knowledgeable about the provenance of the repledged
shares and the relationship between Pledgor and SP, then Pledgor
might argue that Transferee should be charged with notice of that
wrongfulness and, hence, lose its protection under the adverse claim

cut-off rules.27
The duty of good faith performance under the UCC, like the
similar duty of good faith and fair dealing applicable under the

common law of contracts, is famously elusive. 28 But exercise of a right
26. R. § 9-102(a)(43). This expanded definition of "good faith" by its literal terms applies
only as that term is used within Article 9 (as per the preamble of Revised 9-102(a)). However,
Comment 19 to Revised 9-102 states that the expanded definition was intended to be used for
purposes of section 1-203 as that section may apply to contracts or duties within Article 9.
27. The phrasing in text ("notice") assumes that Pledgor is not an entitlement holder of SP
with respect to the repledged securities, so that the adverse claim cut-off rule applicable to
Transferee is section 8-502 (or, if the repledged security is directly held, as in the LucklessMegaLender example, section 8-303). A similar "good faith" argument could be advanced by
Pledgor if SP were Pledgor's securities intermediary with respect to the repledged securities,
though the applicable cut-off rule then would be section 8-503(e). In that event, Pledgor's
argument would be that its consent to the repledge (which SP is required to obtain under
section 8-504(b)) is qualified by SP's duty of "good faith."
28. See generally 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 7.17, 7.17b
(2nd ed. 1998). For a discussion applying the concept to Former Article 9 (which among other
things observes that "at no time did the drafters, nor any of the groups commenting on
proposed drafts of the Code, pay any attention to the role of good faith performance or
enforcement in Article Nine"), see Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of
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of repledge is remote from the settings to which the doctrine is
traditionally applied. A 1994 commentary by the UCC's Permanent
Editorial Board states that, under the UCC, the doctrine is essentially
a rule of contract interpretation, the purpose of which is to preserve
the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties For a pledgor
to allow the secured party to repledge is a simple binary choice, and
the main practical consequence of allowing it-that the pledgor takes
the credit risk of the secured party with respect to return of the
collateral-is easy to understand. That risk is similar to the kinds of
risks reasonable people take every day, such as when deciding to sell
goods on credit, or to hold money in a bank in excess of the FDIC's
insurance coverage. If a pledgor agrees to assume that risk, there is no
basis in the doctrine of good faith performance for tagging a secured
party or its transferee with any adverse consequences.
The doctrine of good faith performance might more plausibly be
invoked to prevent a secured party who does not have a contractual
right of repledge in a security agreement negotiated under Former
Article 9 from exercising the statutory right of repledge after the
effective date of Revised Article 9. In such a situation, a Pledgor
might with some plausibility argue that preservation of the parties'
reasonable expectations requires SP to refrain from "impairing"
repledges after Revised Article 9 becomes effective. As a practical
matter, such a case is likely to arise only if SP subsequently fails and
Pledgor seeks to recover its repledged securities from Transferee. To
defeat Transferee's rights under the adverse claim cut-off rules,
Pledgor would have to show that Transferee knew of the
wrongfulness of SP's conduct.30 Pledgor thus would have to show, to
begin with, that Transferee knew that the pledged securities were not
SP's. That would seem difficult to establish for publicly-traded
securities-though it might be less difficult in a case involving closelyheld securities, as in the Luckless-MegaLender example. If Pledgor is
able to establish Transferee's knowledge of Pledgor's ownership,
Pledgor also would have to establish that Transferee knew of the
wrongfulness of the repledge as against Pledgor. Even if Pledgor
Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 382
(1988).

29. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL
COMMENTARY NO. 10 (Feb. 10, 1994).

BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,

30. See U.C.C. § 8-105 & cmt. 2. "Knowledge" under the adverse claim cut-off rules in
effect includes willful blindness as well as actual knowledge. See U.C.C. § 8-105(a)(1), (2) &
cmt. 4.
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succeeds in showing that Transferor knew that the Pledgor-SP
security agreement is silent as to repledge (which again seems likely
to be difficult), Transferee might reasonably counter by noting that
the statute does, after all, provide an unlimited right of repledge
following its effective date, and that the "good faith" standard should
not be applied to subvert the plain language of the transitional rules.
How such a case would play out is unclear. But in any event, if
after the effective date of Revised Article 9 Pledgor executes documentation that does not restrict the statutory right of repledge, it is
hard to see how Pledgor would have a valid complaint if SP exercises
that right. That's what gap-filling provisions are for.
In the long run, the unlimited statutory right of repledge
provided by Revised 9-207(c)(3) may not be the most significant
feature of Revised Article 9 relating to repledge. After a transitional
period, forms will no doubt be modified to limit that right in
appropriate settings. More interesting is what the revision has to say
about the nature of the relationship between the pledgor and secured
party if repledge or sale of the pledged securities is contemplated or
effected. To that subject we now turn.
II. SECURED TRANSACTION OR SALE? CHARACTERIZING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLEDGOR AND SECURED PARTY IF
REPLEDGE OR NONACCOUNTABLE SALE IS PERMITTED

A. Introduction: The Case of the Missing Res
1. The Characterization Issue and Nonaccountable Sale
Consideration of extreme cases often helps to clarify matters,
and so it is useful to begin by recalling a point made in the
introduction and ignored until now. Standard security agreements
widely used in connection with capital market transactions today
provide that the secured party may, before default, not merely
repledge the collateral, but also may sell the collateral outright and
use the resulting proceeds for its own purposes. The secured party is
still obliged to return "the collateral" to the pledgor when the
pledgor's obligation has been satisfied, but if the secured party has
sold the collateral, the secured party obviously can satisfy that
obligation only by going into the market and purchasing equivalent
securities for delivery to the pledgor.
Such consensual pre-default sales seem to be a relatively recent
development. Outside the capital markets arena, it is not easy to
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think of settings in which a secured party is given the right to sell the
collateral before default. A distant analogy may be drawn to the
operation of cash collateral arrangements, in which funds held by a
secured party are invested in money market investments, which might
be liquidated before maturity and reinvested in other such
instruments. The right to select the investments to be liquidated is
usually given to the debtor before default, but sometimes it is given to
the secured party. However, such arrangements are not really very
similar to the kinds of pre-default sales of collateral described in the
preceding paragraph, because in such a cash collateral arrangement
the security interest attaches to the proceeds, which remain
identifiably the debtor's property and the res to which the security
interest continues to attach. This is no more exciting than the
standard floating lien on accounts and inventory, in which the
collateral likewise turns over constantly. The mere fact that the
secured party has the right to sell the collateral free of the debtor's
interest, and does so, does not seem inconsistent with the
characterization of the transaction as a secured transaction-at least
so long as the secured party immediately accounts for the proceeds,
either by holding them as substitute collateral, applying them to
reduce the secured debt, or remitting them to the debtor. 31 But
characterization problems do arise if the secured party instead has the
right to use the proceeds of sale for its own purposes, so that the res
to which the security interest has attached is gone, but the obligation
secured still remains. For brevity, this paper sometimes refers to such
an arrangement as a "nonaccountable sale," it being understood that
the reference is to a situation in which the pledgor's rights in the
collateral have been cut off or subordinated (due to the operation of
the adverse claim cut-off rules of Article 8 or otherwise) and in which
the secured party is not obligated to account immediately for the
proceeds in one of the foregoing ways.
The practice of permitting nonaccountable sale of pledged
securities is doubtless attributable to the prevalence of the repurchase
agreement ("repo") as a substitute for secured lending in the
31. Similarly unproblematic from a characterization standpoint are situations in which a
secured party sells one item of fungible collateral and immediately replaces it with a substitute.
See, e.g., Fedders Corp. v. Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 961, 974 (D. Minn. 1979), cited in Cohen v. Army
Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp.), 67 B.R. 557,
588 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); see also MEYER, supra note 19, § 67 (noting stockbroker's right to
substitute certificates for pledged margin securities at common law); RESTATEMENT OF
SECURITY § 12 cmt. c (1941) (similar).
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government securities markets. In a repo transaction, A sells to B a
marketable security, typically a U.S. Treasury or federal agency
security, for cash, with the parties simultaneously agreeing that B will
sell to A, and A will purchase from B, an equivalent security on an
agreed future date and for an agreed price (typically equal to the
amount received by A in the initial sale, plus an amount equivalent to
interest on that sale price to the repurchase date). Obviously such a
transaction is economically equivalent to a secured loan by B, the
repo buyer, to A, the repo seller. There has been a long-simmering
debate as to whether repo transactions are properly characterized as
sales or as secured loans, though much of the steam was taken out of
the debate by amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and federal bank
insolvency law that effectively exempt broad categories of repos
(however characterized) from most of the usual consequences of an
insolvency proceeding.3 2 The immediate point, however, is that repos
have blurred the distinction in the marketplace between a pledge and
a sale as to U.S. Treasury and federal agency securities.
But from a commercial law perspective, a secured party's
outright sale of collateral is, at least at first blush-even second
blush- conceptually quite different from repledging it. Former
9-207(2)(e) speaks in terms of a secured party's right to "repledge"
collateral; Revised 9-207(c)(3) modernizes the wording to "create a
security interest" in collateral; but nothing in the text or history of
either provision suggests that they have any application to an outright
sale by the secured party. 33 Unlike repledge, nonaccountable sale
seems entirely alien to the traditional conception of a secured
transaction. Many statements can be found in pre-UCC authorities
dismissing out of hand any notion that a secured party may rightfully
sell the collateral before default, an act conceived of as "separating
the debt from the security" (evil), as contrasted with assigning a debt
along with the collateral securing it (good)-though for the most part
32. The most recent major cases on characterization of repos, which canvass prior cases,
are County of Orangev. Fuji Securities, Inc. (In re County of Orange), 31 F. Supp. 2d 768 (C.D.
Cal. 1998), and GranitePartners,L.P. v. Bear Steams & Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
The leading academic commentary is Jeanne L. Schroeder, Repo Madness: The Characterization
of Repurchase Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C., 46 SYRACUSE L. REV.
999 (1996). For the history of the repo market, see MARCIA STIGUM, THE REPO AND REVERSE
MARKETS 107-15 (1989).
33. Cf Ocean Nat'l Bank v. Diment, 462 A.2d 35, 39 (Me. 1983) (Former 9-207(2)(e),
"which deals with a 'repledge of collateral' by a secured party, is clearly inapplicable to [secured
party's] outright relinquishment" of stock certificates to a new secured party following discharge
of the first secured party's debt). See also Schroeder, supra note 32, at 1023.
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those assertions were made without reference to the effect of consent
by the debtor.3 " Grant Gilmore likewise dismissed the notion that a
secured party may rightfully sell collateral before default, but at least
considered the effect of the debtor's consent:
Needless to say, the common law has always stigmatized such a
transfer of a pledgor's property as a conversion. It may be safely
assumed that the conversion would be a conversion still even if the
pledge agreement authorized the pledgee to sell the property
(without assigning the debt) whenever he felt like it. The Code says
nothing about such unauthorized sales by secured parties in § 9-207
or in any other section. Such a sale would seem clearly enough to
be a violation of the secured party's inescapable duty to use
reasonable care in custody and preservation of the collateral so that
we may conclude that the Code secured party has no more right to
sell the collateral without assigning the debt than a common law
pledgee did.35
It is difficult to see why this should be so. Capitalist acts between
consenting adults should be valid unless they injure third parties or
offend public policy, and it is hard to see anything inherently harmful
from either perspective about a nonaccountable sale by a secured
party.36 The effect of such a sale is the same as if the debtor had
34. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 23 (1941); EDWARD H. WARREN, MARGIN
CUSTOMERS 388 (1941) ("Judges have repeatedly said that for a pledgee to separate the debt
from the security is a conversion. So far as we know, no judge has ever questioned this
principle-it is accepted as axiomatic."). Research has not located any reported case
meaningfully considering the effect of consent on a pre-default sale of collateral. There are
innumerable cases which, like the Restatement and Professor Warren's treatise, state that a
pledgee cannot sell collateral before default without referring to the possible effect of consent,
see, e.g., Rothschild v. Allen, 86 N.Y.S. 42, 44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904), affd, 73 N.E. 1132 (N.Y.
1905); Douglas v. Carpenter, 45 N.Y.S. 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897), and there are many phrases
which can be wrenched out of context, see, e.g., In re Salmon Weed & Co., 53 F.2d 335, 338 (2d
Cir. 1931) (dictum: "a sale by a pledgee contrary to the terms of the agreement is a
conversion"); Kittredge v. Grannis, 155 N.E. 88, 90 (N.Y. 1926) (disposition of margin securities
to third party, assumed to be authorized, but still a conversion if the securities were sold by the
broker "not for the account of the plaintiff, but with the preconceived idea of appropriating the
proceeds"); Borden v. District of Columbia, 417 A.2d 402, 404 (D.C. 1980) (tax case; disposition
of securities collateral by secured party held wrongful, despite language in security agreement
allowing secured party to "use or hypothecate" the security); cf. Chittenden Trust Co. v.
Marshall, 507 A.2d 965, 969 (Vt. 1986) (inexplicably suggesting that secured party may have
breached of duty of care or violated redemption right by assigning secured debt together with
collateral securing it).
35. 2 GILMORE, supra note 12, § 42.10, at 1156.
36. A nonaccountable sale might be argued to harm unsecured creditors of Pledgor,
because from the perspective of Pledgor it trades the pledged security (or at least any excess of
the value of the pledged security over the amount of Pledgor's debt to SP) for SP's personal
obligation to Pledgor to replace the pledged security. But the same is true in any securities
lending transaction, and, for that matter, in any sale of property on credit. The limits of a
debtor's right, as against its unsecured creditors, to transfer its property are generally set by
fraudulent transfer law, and a transfer of a security by Pledgor to SP in exchange for SP's
personal obligation to return an equivalent security would not be a fraudulent transfer except in

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1109

transferred the security in question outright to the secured party, in
exchange for the secured party's contractual undertaking to return an
equivalent security to the debtor in the future. Such so-called
"securities lending" transactions, described in more detail below, are
commonplace today,
The basic problem posed by a nonaccountable sale is not that the
transaction is somehow wrongful as against the pledgor despite the
pledgor's consent. Rather, the problem is whether the relationship
between the pledgor and the secured party after such a sale (or,
perhaps, even before the sale, if the secured party is authorized to
sell) ought to be characterized as a secured transaction. The essence
of the definition of "security interest" is "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an
obligation. '37 If there is no res, there can be no security interest. So
the most natural characterization of the relationship after the pledged
securities are sold is not a secured transaction, but rather that the two
parties are mutual creditors, "pledgor" still owing the underlying
"secured obligation" to the "secured party" and "secured party"
having a personal obligation to deliver to the "pledgor" a security
equivalent to the "pledged" security following the payment of the
underlying "secured obligation." (The terminology of secured
transactions is inappropriate to the transaction as so characterized, of
course, but it is convenient to continue to use that terminology with
the quotation marks understood where appropriate.)
It is probably impossible to state a nontrivial legal proposition so
self-evident that no contrary authority can be dredged up, and the
proposition that there can be no secured transaction without a res is
no exception. The notion of a secured transaction without a res is no
less odd than the notion of a trust without a res, but courts have
recognized the latter creature in a variety of settings. For example,
extreme circumstances. Assuming no actual intent to defraud Pledgor's creditors, the
transaction generally would not be a fraudulent transfer unless SP were in such dire straits at the
time of the transfer that its personal obligation would not be "reasonably equivalent value" for
the property; in addition, Pledgor would have to be insolvent or rendered insolvent by the
transfer. ("Insolvent" is here used loosely to refer to failure to satisfy one or more of the various
financial criteria set forth in the fraudulent transfer statutes.) See UNF. FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT §§ 4, 5, 7A U.L.A.652 (1985); Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(2).
37. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). Of course, the definition of "security interest" includes other
transactions-e.g., sales of accounts and chattel paper and, under Revised Article 9, also sales of
payment intangibles and promissory notes-but that is a mere drafting convention, employed
for brevity, and has no bearing on whether a transaction should be characterized as a lien or a
sale. See, e.g., R. § 9-109 cmts. 4-5.
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when construing, in a bankruptcy setting, a provision of the Internal
Revenue Code that requires withholding taxes held by an employer

to be "held in a special fund in trust for the United States," the U.S.
Supreme Court held that this provision "creates a trust in an abstract
'amount'-a dollar figure not tied to any particular assets.

' 38

This

surely stretches the idea of thing-ness past any reasonable bounds.
Likewise, a few courts have held, or at least have been willing to
assume, that if A pays funds to B as a security deposit in connection
with a lease or other obligation A owes to B, and if B is not required
(by law or contract) to segregate the funds, and so deposits them into
B's general account or otherwise expends them, then the relationship
between B and A with respect to those funds is not that of debtor to

creditor, but rather B has a security interest in "A's money."3 9
But these contrary straws in the wind can be dismissed as
38. Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 55, 62 (1990) (preference challenge to
prepetition payment to IRS by a debtor, made from debtor's general account, of an amount on
account of withholding taxes collected by debtor but not segregated by it; held, payment not
preferential because the funds were "trust funds" and hence not property of the debtor's
estate). After Begier, similar reasoning has been applied to state and municipal taxes, declared
by state law to be "trust fund" monies, that were collected but not segregated by the debtor.
However, courts have tended not to apply the quoted statement with full vigor, but rather have
groped desperately for a res (as by tracing trust-fund monies into the debtor's general account
to which is applied a "lowest intermediate balance" rule). See, e.g., Texas Comptroller of Pub.
Accounts v. Megafood Stores, Inc. (In re Megafoods Stores, Inc.), 163 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 1998);
City of Farrell v. Sharon Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 92 (3rd Cir. 1994). For another trust with a most
dubious res, see 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.14, at 182-83 (1978)
(describing the so-called "swelling of assets" theory applied by some cases in the 1930s, under
which a claimant did not have to trace a specific asset into an insolvent estate).
39. This has been litigated recently in numerous cases involving claims for payment of
interest under Former 9-207(2)(c) on security deposits of various types. A disturbing number of
these cases held or assumed that an unsegregated security deposit involves a security interest in
"money," though these cases have tended to be resolved against the plaintiffs on other grounds.
See, e.g., Demitropoulos v. Bank One Milwaukee, 953 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("pledgor"
did not prove that "secured party" actually earned interest on the "collateral"); Spina v. Toyota
Motor Credit Corp., 703 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. App. 1998) (court assumed that security interest might
exist in unsegregated security deposit, but simply held, based on other Illinois laws on security
deposits, that legislature "never envisioned" auto lessors paying interest thereon under Former
9-207); Brooks v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 1998 WL 122774 (N.D. I11.1998) (similar);
Wiskup v. Liberty Buick Co., 953 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. II. 1997) (similar); see also In re Barr, 180
B.R. 156 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995) (security interest in general intangibles held not to cover
debtor's security deposit with electric utility, which was held to be "money"), affd, 383 F.2d 606
(5th Cir. 1967); In re Atlanta Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ga. 1966) (equipment lessor
held to have security interest in lessee's security deposit, as "money"; such security interest held
to have been perfected by "possession"); cf. Yeager v. General Motors Acceptance
Corporation, 719 So. 2d 210 (Ala. 1998) (auto lessor not liable for interest on unsegregated
security deposit because the "the language of the lease, with respect to security deposits, does
not expressly and specifically indicate that the parties intended to create a security interest").
Grant Gilmore, who famously declared that "a right of set-off is not a security interest and
has never been confused with one: [Article 9] might as appropriately exclude fan dancing," 1
GILMORE, supra note 12, § 10.8 at 315-16, must be turning in his grave.
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exceptional, the trust-fund tax cases on the ground that they give
effect to an extraneous statute that was perceived to supervene
ordinary principles, and the security deposit cases on the ground that
they are just plain wrong. The courts in the security deposit cases are
by no means the first to have confused physical currency (which is all
that "money" means, or at least ought to mean, in the UCC sense)
with a chose in action for payment of money.4° This is merely an
extension of the persistent illusion that when X deposits money in the
bank, the bank stashes it in a box with X's name on it. That illusion
dies very hard.
Yet despite the textual and conceptual difficulty of characterizing
a relationship as continuing to be a secured transaction after a
nonaccountable sale, security agreements used in connection with
capital markets transactions do permit such sale, as well as repledge,
and continue to refer to the relationship thereafter as being a secured
transaction. This is true of the standard security documentation used
in the OTC derivatives market, for example, though that documentation also contains setoff provisions that recognize the possibility that
4
the relationship may be recharacterized as that of mutual creditors. 1
This characterization issue arises in a particularly striking way in
securities lending transactions. A typical securities lending
arrangement involves two parties, broker B and investor C. Broker B
may have need of a security of a particular type that B does not own
or control. A common reason is that one of B's customers has
instructed B to make a short sale of the security for the customer's
account. The customer hopes that the price of the security will later
fall, so that she may then close out her short position by purchasing
the security at a lower price. In the meantime, B must deliver the
security to whomever purchased it, and so if B does not have the
security in his own inventory, B must borrow the security from
investor C, who has it in his, in exchange for B's promise to return an
equivalent security to C in the future. Notwithstanding the
40. See, e.g., In re Koreag, 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992); Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co.,
571 N.E.3d 641 (N.Y. 1991) (both holding forward foreign exchange transactions to be
transactions in "goods" subject to Article 2). These bizarre decisions have been widely
criticized. See, e.g., Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & James H. Freis, Jr. Resolving Funds Transfer
Disputes Related to Currency Exchange Transactions:What Law Governs? 1995 COMM. L. ANN.
297 (Louis F. Del Duca & Patrick Del Duca eds.). The proposed revisions to Article 2 will
reverse them. See Proposed §§ 2-102(a)(21), 2-103(d) (Annual Meeting Draft, July 23-30, 1999);
see also R. §§ 9-102 cmt. 5, 9-332 cmt. 2 (emphasizing that "money" under U.C.C. § 1-201(24)
means physical currency, not funds credited to a deposit account).
41. See ISDA Credit Support Annex, supranote 14, paras. 8(a)(iii), 8(b)(iv)(A).
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"borrowing/lending" terminology colloquially used, the transfer of
the "loaned" security from C to B is, and is intended to be, an
outright sale that divests C of any further property interest in the
security-indeed, the whole point of the transaction is to allow B to
make good delivery of the security to B's purchaser. Few Bs are
sufficiently creditworthy to make it prudent for C to rely on B's
unsecured promise to return an equivalent security, and for that
reason (as well as regulatory requirements applicable to most Bs and
Cs), B typically secures its obligation to C by pledging marketable
securities, typically U.S. Treasury securities.4 1 Standard documentation allows C, if C is itself a broker-dealer, liberty to sell, repledge, or
otherwise dispose of the pledged collateral, without accounting for
4 3
the proceeds.
The piquant result is that B and C may wind up making mutual
transfers of securities, and undertaking mutual obligations, that are
completely symmetrical but which the documentation characterizes in
two quite different ways. With respect to the "loaned" security
delivered by C to B, C has no property right in the security once
delivered to B, and B has only a personal obligation to return a like
security to C. The documentation refers to that relationship between
B and C as that of debtor and creditor. With respect to the U.S.
Treasury securities delivered as "collateral" by B to C, C likewise
may be entitled to sell the securities, free of B's rights, in which case
C obviously has only a personal obligation to return a like security to
B. But the documentation refers to this relationship as if it were a
security interest by C in that now-vanished "collateral."
Nonaccountable sale thus poses in a pure form a characterization
issue that might be called "the case of the missing res." Not the least
42. For example, on the borrowing side, a broker-dealer or government securities dealer
that borrows securities from a customer must provide collateral with a market value equal to at
least 100% of the market value of all outstanding securities loaned. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.15c3-3(b)(3), 403.4 (1998). Borrowing and lending of securities by broker-dealers is also
subject to Federal Reserve Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. pt. 220 (1998), which does not presently
impose a collateral requirement. On the lending side, various regulated entities, such as pension
plans, mutual funds and banks, are subject to regulations which require them to obtain collateral
when they lend securities. For an overview from a legal perspective, see Jon R. Lind & Gregory
J. Nowak, Special Report on InternationalSecurities Lending: United States, INT'L FIN. L. REV.
31 (1991 Special Supp.), and the notes to the form of securities loan agreement prepared by The
Bond Market Association, <www.bondmarkets.com/market/funding.shtml> (visited Oct. 1,
1999).
43. See supra note 15. Whether a pledge of securities on terms that permit nonaccountable
sale or repledge might be treated as a securities lending transaction for regulatory purposes is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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of the many odd things about it is that in this instance the parties are
seeking to contract into Article 9. In all the more familiar settings in
which characterization issues arise, such as equipment leasing, sales of
receivables and repo transactions, the parties label their relationship
as being something-anything-other than a secured transaction.
2. The Characterization Issue and Repledge
Although not quite as extreme as outright sale of collateral,
repledge also gives rise to a situation hard to reconcile with common
intuitions about property rights. This is so even where the property
rights can be associated with a discrete, identifiable thing and no
questions of tracing arise. Consider the following simple repledge:
Pledgor owes SP $50 and secures her debt by a pledge of a particular
certificated security worth $60, the duly endorsed certificate being
delivered to SP; SP then (with the consent of Pledgor) repledges that
certificate to Transferee to secure SP's own obligation of $200 to
Transferee. Pledgor still counts herself as being the owner of that
security, but SP is also making use of the full value of the securitynot merely the portion that secures Pledgor's debt to SP-in a way
that only owners can normally do. One piece of property is doing the
work of two. The situation is reminiscent of nothing so much as the
doctrine of Miraculous Multiplication, invoked by medieval
theologians to explain in a politic way the fact that the alleged
fragments of the True Cross scattered throughout Europe, if gathered
together, would fill a lumber yard. The doctrine does the job, after a
fashion, but is unlikely to convince anyone who is not already a
believer.
The notion that Pledgor is still the owner of the underlying thing
gets stretched still further if we consider tracing problems that may
arise. For example, assume SP is holding securities of the same series
pledged by two different Pledgors and repledges some but not all of
them; which Pledgor's securities are deemed to have been repledged
and which retained? Moreover, one must consider the possibility of
successive repledges, at each stage of which a similar tracing issue
may arise: i.e., Transferee in turn repledges the security to secure an
obligation Transferee owes to T-2, who in turn repledges the security
to secure an obligation it owes to T-3, etc. It may be possible to
contrive tracing rules to deal with such situations, but even someone
sympathetic to tracing arguments may blanch at the notion that
Pledgor is really still the owner of the underlying thing.
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If Pledgor really is still the owner of the pledged security
following its repledge by SP to Transferee, then it would seem quite
plausible to conclude that in the event of Pledgor's bankruptcy the
security would be deemed property of the Pledgor's estate and,
hence, the automatic stay would prevent Transferee (or a remote
repledgee, if Transferee itself repledged) from taking any action to
foreclose upon the security repledged to it. The teaching of United
States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.44 is that the debtor's estate includes
property owned by the debtor even if the debtor's ownership interest
is worthless because the property secures an obligation many times
larger than the value of the property. If such a remote and tenuous
ownership interest sucks the whole property into the maw of the
45
bankruptcy court, why not Pledgor's ownership interest, too?
It is important to emphasize that the "sale or secured
transaction" issue lurking behind repledge arises quite independently
of any of the changes made in Revised Article 9. It is inherent in
allowing SP to separate the debt from the collateral, as occurs in any
"impairing" repledge, regardless of whether SP's authority to make
the repledge derives from Pledgor's consent or from the expanded
repledge rights granted by Revised Article 9. Nonaccountable sale
likewise separates the debt from the collateral. But unlike a
nonaccountable sale, the pre-UCC broker repledge cases provide
substantial precedent for continuing to characterize the relationship
between Pledgor and SP as being a secured transaction if the
separation takes the form of a repledge-however illogical the
distinction between a sale and an "impairing" repledge may be in this
context.
In most settings involving the characterization of a transaction as
a "lien" or "something else," courts have considered that because the
issue implicates the rights of third persons (typically the creditors of
one of the parties), it cannot be resolved solely on the basis of the
label applied by the parties, but rather must be determined
objectively based on the substantive attributes of the transaction. 46
44. 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
45. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 362(a)(4), 541(a). On the hermeneutics of Whiting Pools, see
David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundationsof Securitization, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1055
(1998), and Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY L.J.
1193 (1998).
46. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth That the U.C.C.
Killed "Property," 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1281 (1996), and Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism
About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (1996), both incorporated into JEANNE
L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES (1998).
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Courts have proclaimed loudly and firmly their willingness to ignore
labels in traditional settings, such as a deed absolute on its face

coupled with the transferee's agreement to convey the property back
to the transferor upon payment of a stated sum, or a purported
equipment lease that conveys to the lessee too many of the sticks in
the bundle. Indeed, the compulsion to look to objective criteria was

so strong that it overcame the explicit statement in the pre-1987 UCC
that the "lease vs. security interest" determination was to be made on
the basis of the parties' intent. 47 Courts routinely construed that in a

Humpty-Dumpty fashion to mean not what the parties said they
intended, or thought they intended, but rather the "objective
manifestations of intent"-or in plainer language, the substantive
attributes of the transaction, not the label the parties applied to it.48 In
settings where courts have not had enough experience to develop
settled rules, such as repo transactions and sales of receivables, courts
by and large have tended to do the reasonable thing, and temporize.

This temporization sometimes takes the form of listing every factor
that strikes the court as conceivably relevant, "weighing" them, and
pronouncing judgment; sometimes it takes the form of throwing up
the hands and deferring to the parties' label. 49 One suspects, however,

that if courts are left to wrestle with these characterization issues for
long enough, they would in time develop and employ objective rules
(perhaps while still flying the flag of "objective manifestations of
intent," the same rhetorical shift employed in the pre-1987 equipment
lease cases).
Repledge defies this expectation. If Pledgor consents to an

"impairing" repledge, SP may repledge the securities in a way that
47. Compare U.C.C. § 1-205(37) (1962 Official Text) (purported lease is security interest if
"intended as security") with id. (1995 Official Text) (omitting references to "intent" in this
context and adding elaborate objective guidelines).
48. Cases are gathered in 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 30-3 (4th ed. 1995), and more extensively in Corinne Cooper, Identifying
a PersonalProperty Lease Under the UCC, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 195 (1988).
49. Thus, in the most influential case on characterization of repo transactions, Cohen v.
Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp.), 67
B.R. 557 (D.N.J. 1986), Judge Debevoise, after a masterly exposition, threw up his hands and
deferred to the parties' label. For other cases on repos, including some which take the "list every
conceivable factor" approach, see the authorities cited supra note 32. There is a voluminous
literature on characterization of receivables sales, far outweighing (at least in volume) the
relatively scanty case law. See, e.g., 1 JASON H.P. KRAVIrT, SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL
ASSETS § 5.03 (2nd ed. 1999) (giving primacy to the label); Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking
the Role of Recourse in the Sale of FinancialAssets, 53 BuS. LAW. 159 (1996) (giving primacy to
extent of recourse); Thomas E. Plank, True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 287 (1991) (giving primacy to the payment of full value).
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wipes out all value Pledgor's ownership interest might have. As a
matter of substance, the difference between such a transaction and an
outright sale to SP is little but the label. Yet courts historically
respected the label. Before the wellsprings dried up around 1940,
courts had plenty of experience over plenty of time with brokers'
repledges, but the cases seem not to have expressed any doubt in the
cases that repledged securities remained the Pledgor's property, so
long as traceable, no matter how much Pledgor's ownership interest
might be squeezed by the repledge.
If the world were new, a different approach might be taken to
the characterization issue, and the line distinguishing a pledge of
securities from an outright sale could be drawn on the basis of
whether the pledgor consented to separation of the debt from the
collateral. In other words, the rule would be that if SP has the right to
"impair" Pledgor's redemption right (in the common law sense
described earlier), as would be the case if SP is entitled to make an
"impairing" repledge or a sale, then Pledgor has given SP more rights
in the collateral than is consistent with Pledgor's continued
ownership, and the purported pledge to SP ought to be
recharacterized as a sale (whether or not SP actually does make an
"impairing" repledge or a sale). ° The leading scholarly commentary
on characterization of repo transactions in fact makes essentially this
argument, and for that reason contends that the "sale" label affixed to
a repo transaction should be respected if the repo buyer has the right,
as against the repo seller, to dispose of the security. 1 This "consent to
impairment" test would be simple and logical, and it would avoid the
anomalies described above. But to adopt it would require throwing
overboard the accumulated weight of the broker repledge cases,
which always respected the "pledge" label notwithstanding Pledgor's
consent to "impairing" repledges by SP. Moreover, this "consent to
impairment" test cannot peacefully co-exist with the unlimited right
50. Another way to sum up this approach would be to say that a purported pledge in which
the secured party has the right to dispose of the collateral (through outright sale or "impairing"
repledge) before default is not a secured transaction, but rather a disguised securities lending
transaction. Of course, if carried through consistently in all legal contexts, this
recharacterization could have unpleasant tax and regulatory consequences. But anyone with
experience in securitization transactions should have no reason to gag at the prospect of arguing
with a straight face that a transaction may have a characterization for commercial law and
bankruptcy purposes that differs from its characterization for tax and regulatory purposes.
51. See Schroeder, supra note 32, at 1017-26. Professor Schroeder distinguished repledge
from sale on the ground that repledge may not "impair the debtor's right to redeem" under
Former 9-207(2)(e), but did not acknowledge the long-standing precedent allowing the pledgor
to permit "impairing" repledges.
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of repledge granted by Revised 9-207(c)(3), because that test would
cause all pledge transactions to which that gap-filling rule applies to
be recharacterized as sales.
As a result, it seems likely that a pledge transaction will continue
to be characterized in the traditional way as being a secured
transaction in the underlying security, notwithstanding that an
"impairing" repledge is permitted or effected, despite the dubious
metaphysical underpinnings of that concept. Whether the same is true
if outright sale is permitted or effected seems doubtful, given the lack
of historical and textual support for that notion, and given the
absence of even the nominal res arguably present in a repledge
transaction. However, as we shall see, the Comments to Revised
Article 9 contemplate the possibility that, following such a sale, the
relationship between the parties might still continue to be a secured
transaction -though not in the now-departed security, but rather in a
different res.
B. In Quest of a Res: The CharacterizationIssue Under Revised
Article 9
1. Parsing Revised 9-314(c)
Revised Article 9 addresses the foregoing characterization issue
in an oblique way. What it says on the subject appears primarily in the
Comments. Aside from the gap-filling rule giving the secured party
the right to repledge, only a single provision in the text of Revised
Article 9 is visibly geared to repledge or nonaccountable sale. That
provision is Revised 9-314(c), which deals with the duration of
perfection by control of investment property:
(c) Investment property: time of perfection by control;
continuation of perfection. A security interest in investment
property is perfected by control under Section 9-106 from the
time the secured party obtains control and remains perfected
by control until:
(1) the secured party does not have control; and
(2) one of the following occurs:
(A) if the collateral is a certificated security, the debtor
has or acquires possession of the security certificate;
(B) if the collateral is an uncertificated security, the issuer
has registered or registers the debtor as the registered
owner; or

(C) if the collateral is a security entitlement, the debtor is
or becomes the entitlement holder.
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This provision is patterned after the third sentence of Former 9-305,
which dealt with the duration of perfection by possession:
A security interest is perfected by possession from the time
possession is taken without a relation back and continues only so
long as possession is retained, unless otherwise specified in this
Article.
To modern eyes this sentence reads like a fortune-cookie proverb, a
truism oddly expressed. The point of the first half of the sentence was
to abolish any vestige of the "equitable pledge" doctrine, under
which, before the 1938 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, the
taking of possession could "relate back" to the time the security
agreement was entered into for purposes of determining whether the
secured party received a preference.5 2 The point of the second half
was the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise specified in this Article,"
which was an opaque cross-reference to the provisions of Former
Article 9 that allow perfection to continue temporarily following
return of the collateral to the debtor in certain circumstances.53 The
two halves do not quite mesh (because the temporary perfection
alluded to is not in fact "by possession"), and the "relation back"
language is now archaic. So Revised 9-313(d), the provision which
now deals with the duration of perfection by possession, brings
forward the former language in a revised form that really is a truism:
If perfection of a security interest depends upon possession of the
collateral by a secured party, perfection occurs no earlier than the
time the secured party takes possession and continues only while
the secured party retains possession.
Until very late in the drafting process, Revised Article 9 used parallel
language to define the duration of perfection by control. The
parallelism ended in the March 1998 draft, which added the language
that became subsection (c) of Revised 9-314.
Subsection (c) of Revised 9-314 has nothing to do with the
concerns that motivated the odd predecessor language of Former
9-305. In effect, subsection (c) says that if SP once has control of a
pledged security, SP is deemed to remain perfected by control until
SP gives it back to Pledgor (in whatever way is appropriate given how
that security is held). Subsection (c) is addressed to the concern that if
SP has repledged (or, perhaps, sold) the security, necessarily SP no
longer "controls" it and hence (but for this provision) literally would
52. See F. § 9-305 cmt. 3. See generally 1 GILMORE, supra note 12, § 14.4.
53. See F. § 9-305 cmt. 3.
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no longer be perfected in it.
Given the assumption that SP continues to have a security
interest at all in "the security" or "the security entitlement" following
such an event (an assumption which, as we have seen, may well be
justified as to a repledge, less so as to a sale), this provision seems fair
enough. Two textual points merit attention. First, subsection (c) deals
only with continuation of perfection, and it does not by its terms give
SP analogous comfort as to continuation of the benefit of the adverse
claim cut-off rules in Article 8. In the indirect holding system, those
rules generally protect only persons who hold or have control over
security entitlements.5 4 If SP has repledged securities, SP will not
remain their entitlement holder or retain control over them (absent
bizarre circumstances). Clearly the adverse claim cut-off rules ought
to be read in the same spirit as Revised 9-314(c), and SP should
continue to receive the benefit of those rules notwithstanding a
repledge.
Second, a drafting quibble can be raised about lack of reference
to "securities accounts" in Revised 9-314(c). There are five kinds of
investment property- "securities" (which come in two flavors,
certificated and uncertificated), "security entitlements," "securities
accounts," "commodity contracts," and "commodity accounts"-and
it is possible for a security interest to be perfected by control in each.5
Revised 9-314(c), however, lays down rules on duration of perfection
by control only for securities and security entitlements, leaving the
statute silent on the duration of perfection by control of a securities
account (as well as commodity contracts and commodities accounts,
which we shall ignore). Indeed, Revised Article 9, like its predecessor,
does not literally define how a secured party obtains control of a
securities account at all. It provides as follows:
A secured party having control of all security entitlements or
commodity contracts carried in a securities account or commodity
account 5 6has control over the securities account or commodity
account.
Literally this is not a definition, but merely an illustration of one way
in which a secured party may obtain control over a securities account.
Nor would it do to read this sentence as if it were a definition, and
54. See U.C.C. §§ 8-502, 8-503(e), 8-510(a).
55. See R. §§9-102(a)(49) (successor to F. §9-115(1)(f)) (definition of "investment
property"), 9-106 (successor to F. § 9-115(1)(e)), 9-314(a) (successor to F. § 9-115(4)(a))
(perfection of investment property by control); R. § 8-106 (definition of "control").
56. R. § 9-106(c) (successor to F. § 9-115(1)(e)).
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conclude that a secured party has control over a securities account if
and only if the secured party has control over all security entitlements
carried in the securities account. As discussed in more detail below, a

security interest in a securities account is supposed to extend to
certain rights in addition to security entitlements carried in the
account. In particular, such a security interest is supposed to include
the right to any credit balance owed to the customer by the securities
intermediary, and that right is not itself a security entitlement. 7 If the

only way to obtain "control" over a securities account is to have
control over all security entitlements carried in the securities account,
a secured party could not have "control" over a securities account
which happens to carry no securities but which still carries a credit
balance. 8 That would be absurd.

This is indeed a mere drafting quibble, because it seems obvious
what "control" ought to mean as to a securities account: namely, an
arrangement which would suffice to give the secured party control

over all security entitlements carried in the account, whether or not
there actually are any security entitlements so carried. The Comments
make this reasonably clear.5 9 And, while formal consistency might
have called for statement of a rule as to the duration of perfection by

control in this case, it also seems obvious that, just as with duration of
perfection by possession, it should last as long as it lasts.
A similar gap exists in the priority rules applicable to competing

secured parties each of whom has control over investment property.
Revised Article 9 contains such priority rules for each type of

investment property, except for "securities accounts." Common sense
again readily supplies the priority rule that should be applied to

competing controlling security interests in a securities account. 60
57. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
58. A secured party of logical bent might assert that it literally satisfies the definition of
"control" postulated in the text, on the ground that it is trivially true that the secured party has
control of "all security entitlements carried in the account" when the account is empty.
Logically that is true, but by that reasoning it is equally true that everyone else in the world has
control, too.
59. See R. § 9-106 cmt. 4 (carrying forward with minor changes language from F. § 9-115
cmt. 4 para. 7).
60. Consider a securities account which carries a credit balance, and which may or may not
have security entitlements credited to it, and assume that competing secured parties have
control over the securities account. What rule determines priority in the credit balance? If one
of the secured parties is the securities intermediary, the special rule in Revised 9-328(3) (which
applies to "securities accounts" as well as to "security entitlements") would apply and give the
securities intermediary priority. If, however, neither secured party is the securities intermediary,
that special rule does not apply. Revised 9-328(2), which sets forth the general priority rules for
competing control parties, does not literally apply, because it sets forth no priority rule for
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These observations are fussy, but this is a point on which the
fussiness is called for. "Control" is by design an artificial construct, to
61
be construed strictly in accordance with its statutory definition.
Fussiness is the price of insisting that courts follow the statute and
nothing but the statute.
More fundamental than these drafting points is the fact that
Revised 9-314(c) addresses only the duration of perfection following
SP's repledge or sale of collateral. It does not say whether the
relationship between Pledgor and SP remains a secured transaction at
all. To that subject we now turn.
2. The "Doppelganger Theory" of Revised Article 9
Revised Article 9 touches on the characterization issue in the
Comments, most pointedly in the following extraordinarily rich
paragraph of Comment 3 to Revised 9-314.62
In a transaction in which a secured party who has control grants a
security interest in investment property or sells outright the
investment property, by virtue of the debtor's consent or applicable
legal rules, a purchaser from the secured party typically will cut off
the debtor's rights in the investment property or be immune from
the debtor's claims. See Section 9-207, Comments 5 and 6. If the
investment property is a security, the debtor normally would retain
no interest in the security following the purchase from the secured
party, and a claim of the debtor against the secured party for
redemption (Section 9-623) or otherwise with respect to the
security would be a purely personal claim. If the investment
property transferred by the secured party is a financial asset in
which the debtor had a security entitlement credited to a securities
account maintained with the secured party as a securities
intermediary, the debtor's claim against the secured party could
arise as a part of its securities account notwithstanding its personal
nature. (This claim would be analogous to a "credit balance" in the
securities account, which is a component of the securities account
even though it is a personal claim against the intermediary.) In the
case in which the debtor may retain an interest in investment
property notwithstanding a repledge or sale by the secured party,
"securities accounts" as such. The common-sense solution is to apply the priority rules of
Revised 9-328(2) to the credit balance as if it were a security entitlement. This point did not
arise under Former Article 9, under which the general rule was that all control secured parties
shared pari passu. That priority rule was drafted to apply to all "investment property" and,
hence, securities accounts. See F. § 9-115(5)(b).
61. See, e.g., R. § 8-106 cmt. 7.
62. Similar principles are alluded to, or are implicit in, Comments 5 and 6 to Revised 9-207,
Comment 3 to Revised 9-623, and Example 6 to U.C.C. § 8-502 (an example added by Revised
Article 9).
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subsection (c) makes clear that the security interest will remain
perfected by control.
So this Comment describes a case in which the relationship between
Pledgor and SP may continue to be a secured transaction even
following SP's sale of the pledged securities. The theory of the
Comment is that the purely personal claim for redemption which
Pledgor has against SP following such sale may itself be viewed as the
res of a continuing secured transaction between Pledgor and SP. The
Comment applies that theory in one particular setting: namely, when
the pledged securities were held in a securities account that Pledgor
maintains with SP, as Pledgor's securities intermediary. In that
setting, the Comment suggests that SP's personal obligation could be
deemed "part of" that securities account, and, hence, be a species of
investment property to which SP's security interest could attach. 63 As
a result, even after SP sells the pledged securities, they would in effect
have a shadowy, Zen-like continuing existence as between Pledgor
and SP. SP's personal obligation to Pledgor on account of Pledgor's
redemption right would serve as a doppelganger for an actual security
entitlement (which disappeared with the sale of the securities), and
the Comment in effect holds that in the right circumstances the ghost
may be treated much as though it were the thing itself. This basic
idea-that SP's redemption obligation may be viewed as the res of a
continuing secured transaction-may be dubbed the "Doppelganger
Theory" (or the "Theory" for short).
The Doppelganger Theory is as ingenious and self-referential as
an M.C. Escher print, and it calls for careful analysis.
a. The Doppelganger Theory and the TraditionalUnderpinningsof
Repledge
To begin with, although the above Comment refers both to sale
and repledge, the metaphysical underpinnings of the Theory differ
from the traditional underpinnings of repledge. The Doppelganger
Theory considers the res of the secured transaction between Pledgor
and SP after a repledge or a sale to be SP's personal obligation on
account of Pledgor's redemption right (which, for short, we shall
often refer to simply as SP's "redemption obligation"). By contrast,
under the traditional conception of a repledge, the Pledgor was still
63. Comment 3 to Revised 9-314 uses the word "could," not "would." But if there are
conditions to application of the Doppelganger Theory other than those discussed herein, it is
not clear what they might be.
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viewed as being the owner of the underlying security following a
repledge, and the res of the secured transaction between Pledgor and
SP was still viewed as being that security. It might be argued that this
traditional conception still applies in the case of a repledge, without
any need to invoke the Doppelganger Theory. In the case of an
outright sale, however, the underlying security is inarguably gone, and
so the only possible way to continue to characterize the Pledgor-SP
relationship as being a secured transaction following an outright sale
(and, it should be noted, the above Comment specifically refers to
that possibility) is to hunt up an alternative res. The only plausible
candidate is SP's redemption obligation. Hence the Doppelganger
Theory is more critical to the characterization issue in the case of a
sale than a repledge. For specificity, the following discussion of the
Doppelganger Theory focuses on the context of a sale, but the same
analysis should apply to a repledge if it is necessary to invoke the
Doppelganger Theory in that context at all.
b. The Scope of the DoppelgangerTheory
The Doppelganger Theory, as stated in the above Comment,
applies only to a limited class of pledge relationships. Specifically, the
Comment applies the Theory only when SP is acting as Pledgor's
securities intermediary and the pledged securities were held in a
securities account maintained by Pledgor with SP, so that SP's
redemption obligation may be deemed part of that securities account.
As we will see momentarily, the logic of the above Comment implies
one further condition: namely, that SP was granted a security interest
in Pledgor's entire securities account, not merely the particular
securities pledged by Pledgor.
Thus, the Comment would not apply to a simple pledge in which
SP is not acting as Pledgor's securities intermediary and the pledge is
perfected by transfer of the pledged securities from Pledgor's account
at Pledgor's custodian to SP's account at SP's custodian. In that case,
Pledgor has no securities account with SP, and so SP's redemption
obligation cannot be deemed part of any such securities account.
Furthermore, even if SP is a securities intermediary, the Comment
would apply only if SP had been acting in that capacity with respect to
the pledged securities.
Although the Comment does not explain why its application of
the Doppelganger Theory is limited to situations in which the
foregoing conditions are met, the evident reason is that, absent those

1999] REPLEDGE AND PRE-DEFAULT SALE OFSECURITIES COLLATERAL

1143

conditions, the Theory will lead to perfection and priority problems
for SP. To see this, consider the consequences of applying the
Doppelganger Theory if the conditions described in the Comment are
not met. For example, assume that P-2 maintains a securities account
with SP-2 in which the securities pledged by P-2 to SP-2 were
originally held, and that SP-2's redemption obligation following
SP-2's sale of the securities qualifies as being part of the securities
account. Assume further that SP-2 was granted a security interest
only in the pledged securities, and was not granted a security interest
in Pledgor's entire securities account. Does SP-2 have a perfected
security interest in its redemption obligation after it sells the pledged
securities?
SP-2's redemption obligation, standing alone, is an obligation of
SP-2 to deliver a security to P-2 upon the payment of P-2's debt.
Under the ordinary principles of Revised Article 9, that redemption
obligation, standing alone, would appear to be a general intangible so
far as Pledgor is concerned. 64 That redemption obligation would also
be proceeds of the original collateral, namely P-2's now-vanished
security entitlement with SP-2. Because the redemption obligation is
identifiable, SP-2's security interest in the original collateral should
attach to the redemption obligation under the general rules
applicable to proceeds. 65 Under those rules, moreover, SP-2's security
interest in the redemption obligation would be perfected
automatically for twenty days.66
However, there is nothing in Revised Article 9 that would clearly
prevent SP-2's security interest in its redemption obligation from
becoming unperfected after the twentieth day, absent some further
action by SP-2. If SP-2's redemption obligation were "cash proceeds,"
SP-2's security interest would continue perfected indefinitely. 67 But
SP-2's redemption obligation, which is nonmonetary, would not seem
68
likely to qualify as "cash proceeds," at least not as a general matter.
A second potential candidate for continuing SP-2's perfection
after the twentieth day is Revised 9-314(c), discussed above. But that
provision applies only to the duration of perfection in "investment
64. See
65. See
§ 9-306(2)).
66. See
67. See
68. See

R. § 9-102(a)(42).
R. §§ 9-102(a)(64) (successor to F. § 9-306(1)), § 9-315(a)(2) (successor to F.
R. § 9-315(c), (d).
R. § 9-315(d)(2).
R. § 9-102(a)(9) (successor to F. § 9-306(1)).
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property." Considered alone instead of as part of the securities
account (as would seem necessary if, as we have assumed, SP-2 does
not have a security interest in the entire securities account), SP-2's
redemption obligation seemingly would not be "investment property"
at all: it is certainly not itself a securities account, a security
entitlement, or a security. 69 Rather, as noted above, standing alone it
would seem to be a mere general intangible.
Accordingly, if SP-2 does not have a security interest in the
entire securities account, then in order for SP-2 to continue perfected
in its redemption obligation after the twentieth day, it would seem
necessary for SP-2 to file a financing statement against P-2 covering
SP-2's redemption obligation, considered as a general intangible. Of
course, in a pledge transaction such as this, the last thing a secured
party wishes to do is to file a financing statement. Worse yet, even if
SP-2 did file a financing statement, its security interest in its
redemption obligation might be primed by a competing secured
creditor who has previously filed a financing statement covering
general intangibles. 0
These perfection and priority problems may be avoided if SP has
a security interest in the securities account maintained by Pledgor
with SP. In that case, SP automatically would have control over the
securities account (by virtue of SP's status as securities intermediary
for the account), and, hence, SP would have a perfected security
interest in the securities account, including its redemption obligation
(assuming that the redemption obligation qualifies as being "part of"
the securities account).7' Moreover, SP's status as securities
intermediary for the account would also cause SP's security interest to
prime any competing security interest.72
This final example further illustrates the fact that Revised
9-314(c) rests on a basis different from that of the Doppelganger
69. See R. § 9-102(a)(49) (successor to F. § 9-115(1)(f)).
70. SP's security interest in the redemption obligation would not appear to qualify for the
nontemporal priority in proceeds afforded by Revised 9-322(c), because that applies only to
proceeds that are either "cash proceeds" or "of the same type" as the original pledged
collateral.
71. See U.C.C. § 8-106(e). Literally this gives the secured party control only over "security
entitlements" carried in a securities account, but as discussed in text accompanying supra note
59, that should be sufficient to establish control over the securities account itself.
72. See R. § 9-328(3). In addition, SP might also claim the benefit of the nontemporal
priority in proceeds afforded by Revised 9-322(c), because the redemption obligation,
considered as part of the securities account, would seem to be "of the same type" as the original
collateral.
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Theory. The rule on continued perfection in Revised 9-314(c) applies
to a situation in which the res of the secured transaction is considered
still to be the pledged security entitlement, as would be the case in a
simple pledge, or in a pledge followed by a repledge under the
traditional view of repledge. But the Doppelganger Theory assumes
that the res of the secured transaction is SP's redemption obligation.
In the preceding example, in which SP is Pledgor's securities
intermediary and has a security interest in Pledgor's entire securities
account, SP remains perfected in its redemption obligation by virtue
of SP's continuing control over the securities account. In that setting,
there is no need to refer to the special rule on continued perfection in
Revised 9-314(c).
c. SP's Redemption Obligationas "Partof' Pledgor's Securities
Account with SP
Assume that the conditions set forth in the Comment quoted
above are met: Pledgor maintains a securities account with SP and
pledges it to SP, and SP then sells the securities carried therein. In
what circumstances will SP's redemption obligation be "part of" the
securities account, as contemplated by that Comment?
SP's redemption obligation itself cannot be a "security
entitlement" -or at least not a security entitlement to actual
securities -because a securities intermediary has a duty to hold
securities corresponding to the security entitlements of its entitlement
holders, and SP would be in violation of that duty after it has sold the
securities. 3 Accordingly, the Comment does not characterize SP's
redemption obligation as being a "security entitlement." However, as
the Comment notes, since the 1994 revisions to Article 8 other
Comments have stated that a "securities account" includes certain
personal rights against the intermediary as well as the security
entitlements carried in the account. In particular, as noted earlier, the
Comments contemplate that a security interest in a securities account
includes a security interest on any credit balance owed by the
intermediary to the customer:
Note also that given the broad definition of "securities account" in
Section 8-501, a security interest in a securities account would also
include all other rights of the debtor against the securities
intermediary arising out of the securities account. For example, a
security interest in a securities account would include credit
73. See U.C.C. § 8- 5 04(a).
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balances due to the debtor from the securities intermediary,
74
whether or not they are proceeds of a security entitlement.
According to the Comment applying the Doppelganger Theory, just
as with SP's personal obligation to pay a credit balance to Pledgor,
SP's personal obligation to Pledgor on account of Pledgor's
redemption right may be sufficiently associated with the securities
account to be "part of" it, and hence picked up by a security interest
in the securities account.
The notion that a securities account can include personal
obligations of a securities intermediary that are not security
entitlements is not a happy one. To begin with, that notion appears
only in the Comments, not the statutory text. It is hard to square with
the statutory definition of "securities account," which refers only to
"financial assets" (which by definition are the subject of "security
entitlements"), and contains no hook on which to hang any associated
personal obligations of the intermediary that are not security
entitlements. 75 Moreover, it is unclear what qualifies a particular
personal obligation of a securities intermediary as being sufficiently
associated with a securities account to be deemed "part of" it. The
Comments quoted above are vague on the point ("arise as part of,"
"arise out of"). Contrary to the proceeds-like concept these phrases
might suggest, the Comment quoted immediately above makes a
point of negating any need for a connection between the personal
obligation and security entitlements previously carried in the account.
In the case of a credit balance, perhaps the requisite association
between the personal obligation and the securities account is simply
the intermediary's fiat, in making this association in its own records
and printing the credit balance on the customer's account statement.
By that standard, an SP seeking to invoke the Doppelganger Theory
following a nonaccountable sale should likewise generate account
statements somehow reflecting its redemption obligation-though it
could not, of course, do so by simply showing the sold securities to be
still present in the account, as that would give rise to a security
entitlement to such securities.

74. R. § 9-108 cmt. 4. See also R. § 9-102(a)(49) (successor to F. § 9-115(1)(f)(iii))
(definition of "investment property," which includes "securities account").
75. See U.C.C. §§ 8-102(a)(9), (17), 8-501(a).
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d. Is It Possibleto Have a Security Entitlement to a Personal
Obligationof Ones' Own Securities Intermediary?
One possible way to avoid worrying about whether SP's
redemption obligation is "part of" Pledgor's securities account would
be to characterize Pledgor as having a security entitlement to SP's
redemption obligation. In other words, the financial asset with which
Pledgor's securities account would be credited following the sale
would not be the pledged securities, which of course are gone, but
rather SP's personal obligation to restore them. The definition of
"financial asset" includes any "property that is held by a securities
intermediary" for another person, provided that the intermediary has
expressly agreed with the other person to treat the property as a
financial asset.7 6 So SP's redemption obligation could be a financial
asset if SP, acting as securities intermediary for Pledgor, agrees to
treat it as a financial asset, provided only that it qualifies as "property
that is held by a securities intermediary."
Whether SP's own redemption obligation to Pledgor is
"property" which SP "holds" is a nice metaphysical question.
Professor Rogers, the Reporter for the 1994 revisions to Article 8, has
written that an intermediary's personal obligation with respect to a
credit balance "would not fall within the Article 8 definition of
security entitlement because a security entitlement is not merely a
contractual claim."77 If followed, that position would likewise
disqualify SP's redemption obligation. However, that position leads to
consequences that seem distinctly anomalous. Assume that Bank, a
securities intermediary, issues an ordinary debt obligation (such as a
certificate of deposit, commercial paper note, or bond) that Customer
purchases and has credited to her securities account at Bank. That
debt obligation, when held by Bank for Customer, is likewise a mere
contractual claim by Customer against Bank. Rogers' position would
imply that Customer cannot have a security entitlement in that debt
obligation-in unique contrast to all other debt obligations of all
other issuers that Customer might carry in her account.
That result is hard to swallow, and there is no obvious reason
why it must be choked down. Even a contractual claim, viewed in the
right light, is a species of property ("chose in action"). Article 9
recognizes that fact, insofar as it allows an obligor to take a security
76. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9).
77. 8 ROGERS, supra note 16, § 9-115:6, at 806-07.
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interest in its own obligation. Although such transactions were
perhaps not especially common under Former Article 9, there was
nothing in Former Article 9 to prevent an obligor on a general
intangible (for example) from taking a security interest in that
obligation. The same is true under Revised Article 9. Indeed, Revised
Article 9 may make the practice of taking a security interest in one's
own obligation quite commonplace, because the revision allows a
bank to take a security interest in the deposit obligation it owes to its
customer. 78 Allowing a securities intermediary's personal obligation
on account of a credit balance to be characterized as a "security
entitlement" presents no greater conceptual difficulty than the
Comments' characterization of that obligation as being somehow
"part of" that securities account even though it is not a security
entitlement.
Hence, it seems plausible to suppose that SP's redemption
obligation to Pledgor following repledge or sale of Pledgor's
collateral likewise is eligible to be characterized as a security
entitlement-not, to repeat, an entitlement to actual securities, but
merely to SP's purely personal obligation-which would allow SP to
sidestep the question of what it takes to qualify that redemption
obligation as being "part of" the securities account.
3. Repledge and Nonaccountable Sale Under the Doppelganger
Theory
The reward which the Doppelganger Theory offers in exchange
for undertaking these conceptual acrobatics is not all that great.
Pledgor obviously has the most at stake in the event of a repledge or
nonaccountable sale, because Pledgor runs the risk that, in the event
of SP's insolvency, Pledgor will be unable to recover its property. But
the Doppelganger Theory helps Pledgor not a whit against that risk.
The underlying securities are lost and gone forever once disposed of
by SP to a Transferee protected against the assertion of adverse
claims. 79 All that Pledgor then has is SP's unsecured redemption
7& See R. § 9-340(b) & cmt. 3. As to the general principle that an obligor on a general
intangible may have a security interest in that obligation, see In re Dillard Ford, Inc., 940 F.2d
1507, 1151 n.5 (5th Cir. 1991). See also Subcommittee on the Use of Deposit Accounts as
Original Collateral, Report, in PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9:
APPENDICES TO REPORT 325, 333-34 (1992).
79. This generalization is subject to the qualification that if the disposition is a repledge,
and if a court follows the traditional view that Pledgor remains the owner of the repledged
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obligation, and Pledgor's situation is not improved at all by
conceiving that obligation to be the res of a continuing secured
transaction between Pledgor and SP.
Where does this leave Pledgor in the event of SP's insolvency
following SP's disposition of the pledged securities? Whether or not
the Doppelganger Theory applies, Pledgor is unlikely to have more

than an unsecured claim against insolvent SP for the value of the
securities thus disposed of. The only real question is whether Pledgor

may offset the amount of its debt to SP against the amount of that
claim. Such offset certainly would seem sensible. But this is a subject
the UCC does not address, and Pledgor's right to effect such an offset
would be subject to the vagaries of the law of the relevant state. 80 SP's
redemption obligation is not a garden-variety debt, being

nonmonetary (an obligation to deliver a security) and in some sense
contingent (SP need not deliver the security until Pledgor has paid its
debt), and if the case law in the relevant state draws formalistic
distinctions about the degree of mutuality required to sustain a setoff,
SP's insolvency administrator might be able to raise nonfrivolous
arguments against setoff. 1 In response, Pledgor can point to the preUCC broker insolvency cases, which allowed the customer to offset
against her margin debt the value of the securities carried by the

broker for her account which she was unable to reclaim, even if her
inability to reclaim resulted from a rightful repledge by the broker. 82
collateral, then Pledgor may have certain residual rights against Transferee even if Transferee is
entitled to the benefit of the adverse claim cut-off rules. Under the broker repledge cases, those
residual rights would have included rights in the nature of marshalling (i.e., Transferee may be
compelled to apply proprietary securities of SP before applying securities owned by customers,
and to apply customer securities that were rightfully repledged before applying customer
securities that were wrongfully repledged) and a right of Pledgor to redeem all the collateral
pledged to Transferee by paying SP's full debt to Transferee (Pledgor then becoming
subrogated to SP's rights with respect to securities owned by other customers that Pledgor so
redeems). See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 41 (1941); MEYER, supra note 19, § 75. However,
a Pledgor who allows an impairing repledge cannot count on those rights being worth anything.
80. See R. § 9-109(d)(10) (successor to F. § 9-104(i)) (generally excluding setoff rights from
Article 9).
81. For general discussions of setoff and its limitations, see 5 LAWRENCE P. KING,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
553.01 (15th ed. 1998) [hereinafter COLLIER]; and Stephen L.
Sepinuck, A Defense of Extending Article 9 to Cover Security Interests in Deposit Accounts as
Original Collateral,1995 COMM. L. ANN. 477, 510-20 (Louis F. Del Duca & Patrick Del Duca
eds.).
82. See, e.g., Van Bomel v. Irving Trust Co. (In re Hoyt), 47 F.2d 654, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1931);
see also Cohen v. Savings Bldg. & Loan Co. (In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset
Management Corp.), 896 F.2d 54 (3rd Cir. 1990); cf. In re Salmon Weed & Co., 53 F.2d 335, 340
(2d Cir. 1931) (broker who made wrongful repledge may recoup amount due from margin
customer against damages recoverable for the conversion). See generally MEYER, supra note 19,
§ 169.
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Pledgor might also try to sidestep any mutuality requirement by
arguing that SP's redemption obligation arises out of the same
transaction as Pledgor's debt to SP, and so Pledgor ought to be
83
allowed to net the two obligations under a theory of recoupment.

Drafting of the security documents to allow such setoff or netting
explicitly may be a helpful safeguard, but one hopes that a court
would not be so formalistic as to make that necessary.
Assuming that Pledgor is able to establish its right to setoff or
recoupment as a matter of state law, Pledgor may also have to deal

with further restrictions on setoff imposed by the insolvency law
under which SP's estate is administered. For example, if SP is a
debtor subject to a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code, as a
general rule any setoff against SP procedurally will be subject to the
automatic stay, and substantively may be subject to a variety of

limitations.84 Indeed, some courts have held that setoff is not allowed
as of right in any case, but is always subject to the equitable discretion
of the bankruptcy court. 85 The Bankruptcy Code contains various
special provisions applicable to OTC derivatives transactions that are
broadly designed to allow the solvent party to such a transaction to

close it out and apply any collateral it holds to its counterparty's
obligations upon its counterparty's bankruptcy, without regard to the
automatic stay. Those provisions, however, do not by their terms
clearly authorize an offset by nonbankrupt Pledgor of the value of its
pledged collateral against the obligation it owes to bankrupt SP.86

The Doppelganger Theory comes into its own as a tool for SP in
83. See generally 5 COLLIER, supra note 81, $ 553.10. The recoupment argument might
draw analogical support from cases allowing recoupment as between a security deposit with a
utility and an obligation for utility services. See, e.g., New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v.
McMahon (In re McMahon), 129 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1997). However, there are cases to the
contrary. See, e.g., In re Village Craftsman, Inc., 160 B.R. 740 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993).
84. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 362(a)(7) (automatic stay), 553 (setoff generally).
85. See, e.g., Dayton Sec. Assocs. v. Securities Group 1980 (In re Securities Group 1980), 74
F.3d 1103, 1114 (11th Cir. 1996); FNMA v. County of Orange (In re County of Orange), 183
B.R. 609, 615 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). Courts in some jurisdictions have likewise held that
setoff may be subject to judicial discretion even under nonbankrutpcy law. See, e.g., New Jersey
Nat'l Bank v. Gutterman (In re County of Orange), 219 B.R. 543, 566 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997).
There is, however, contrary authority. See, e.g., In re Applied Logic Corp, 576 F.2d 952, 957 (2d
Cir. 1978); 5 COLLIER, supra note 81, 553.02[3].
86. See Bankruptcy Code § 362(b)(17). For discussion of this provision as applied to
repledge situations, see Johnson, supra note 4, at 981-89. This is one of several similar provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code which afford special treatment to capital markets transactions. See
generally Harold S. Novikoff, Special Bankruptcy Code Protectionsfor Derivative and Other
Capital Market Transactions, in UNDERSTANDING THE BUSINESS, BANKRUPTCY AND
SECURITIES ASPEcTS OF DERIVATIVES 95 (Practicing Law Institute, Martin J. Bienenstock &
Thomas Mowers Mayer co-chairs, 1995).
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the event that Pledgor defaults after SP has repledged or sold the
pledged securities. SP's status in such a case may depend upon the
nature of the disposition and a court's reaction to the characterization
issues discussed earlier. If the disposition was a repledge and the
court takes the traditional view of the characterization issue, the
relationship between SP and Pledgor will continue to be viewed as a
secured transaction, the res of which is the pledged securities. If,
however, the court does not take the traditional view, or if the
pledged securities were sold outright, then SP and Pledgor evidently
will be deemed mutual creditors, in a relationship similar to a
securities lending arrangement. In that case, SP's right to offset its
redemption obligation against Pledgor's debt to SP will be subject to
the vagaries of non-UCC setoff and recoupment law in much the
same way as just discussed in the event of SP's insolvency. If SP is
eligible to take advantage of the Doppelganger Theory, SP
presumably ought still to be able to proceed under these setoff and
recoupment theories, if it wishes."7 But the Doppelganger Theory
adds another knife to SP's belt, in effect allowing SP to ignore the sale
and continue to treat its relationship with Pledgor as a secured
transaction. True, the res of that secured transaction would be SP's
redemption obligation rather than a security entitlement representing
an actual security. But as far as Pledgor, Pledgor's creditors, and the
world at large are concerned, SP's redemption obligation is
indistinguishable from such a security entitlement, at least so long as
SP is solvent.
The relationship between SP and Pledgor in this situation is quite
similar to the relationship between a bank and its customer in the
event that the bank takes a security interest in a deposit account the
customer maintains with the bank, as Revised Article 9 now permits.
SP, like such a bank, may be able to exercise the rights of a secured
creditor against the chose in action it owes, as well as rights of setoff
or recoupment. The benefits to SP of having both sets of rights should
be much the same as the benefits to such a bank. For example, if a tax
lien is asserted against Pledgor, SP might fare better if it has the rights
of a secured creditor instead of setoff rights alone. 88
87. See R. § 9-340(b) (bank may have a right of setoff against, and an Article 9 security
interest in, the same deposit account). Revised 9-340(b) does not by its terms apply to
obligations other than deposit accounts, but there is no reason why the principle it states should
not apply to any obligations in which the obligor also has an Article 9 security interest.
88. Compare, e.g., Horton Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 986 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1993) (tax
lien defeats unexercised right of setoff) with Trust Co. v. United States, 735 F.2d 447 (11th Cir.
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4. Doppelganger Plus: A Road Not Taken by Revised Article 9
For all of this, the Doppelganger Theory may not come into play
very often because, as discussed earlier, its applicability generally will
depend upon SP being a securities intermediary, the pledged
securities being originally credited to a securities account maintained
by Pledgor with SP, and SP taking a security interest in the entire
securities account. With relatively minor changes, Revised Article 9
might have extended the same basic idea to other pledge transactions.
Call this hypothetical extension "Doppelganger Plus." As we have
seen, SP's redemption obligation following a nonaccountable sale can
be viewed as a general intangible owed to Pledgor, in which SP may
claim a security interest under the ordinary rules governing proceeds.
However, unless the special conditions described in the Comment are
satisfied, SP's security interest in that obligation is at risk from a
perfection and priority standpoint. The idea of Doppelganger Plus
would be to modify Article 9 to deal with those perfection and
priority risks directly. Specifically, Article 9 would be written to give
SP an automatically and permanently perfected security interest in its
own redemption obligation following a rightful repledge or
nonaccountable sale, and the priority rules would be modified to
provide that this security interest would have priority over any
competing security interest (other than one which would have primed
SP's security interest in the now-vanished security).
Doppelganger Plus would not be a radical textual departure, as
Revised Article 9 already contains special perfection and priority
rules that are not too dissimilar to these. As to perfection, Revised
Article 9, like Former Article 9, already provides that certain security
9
interests in securities are perfected automatically and permanently8
As to priority in this special type of proceeds, Revised Article 9
already departs from the time-honored "first to file or perfect" rile
and awards priority in proceeds of investment property on a
nontemporal basis in certain circumstances. 90 But the effect of adding
such a wrinkle would be to complicate even further an already
1984) (depository bank having common-law lien against deposit account primed tax lien). For
further discussion of the benefits of having an Article 9 security interest as well as a right to
setoff in the case of a bank which has both rights as against a deposit account, see Bruce A.
Markell, From Property to Contract and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and
Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 963 (1999), and Sepinuck, supra note 81, at 510-20.
89. See R. § 9-309(9), (10).
90. See R. § 9-322(c).
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complex statute, and reasonable minds could differ as to whether the
benefit would be worth the price.

5. Redemption Rights
A loose end that should be tied up relates to the relationship
between repledge and the debtor's right to redeem the collateral. The
right to redeem was fundamental to common-law pledge and to preUCC personal property security statutes.91 Former Article 9 codified
the debtor's redemption right, and aside from stylistic changes

Revised Article 9 carries forward the former statutory language with
only a few minor tweaks. 92 Although the right is often thought of
mainly in connection with the exercise of remedies (perhaps because
of its placement in the portion of Article 9 which deals with default),
the right applies before and after default. Both Former and Revised

Article 9 sternly provide that the debtor may not waive that right
before default.93

The Comments to Revised Article 9 give this familiar statutory
language a novel-seeming twist. Specifically, several Comments
dealing with repledge, including the one quoted above in connection
with the Doppelganger Theory, describe the debtor's redemption
right as one that may be limited to a purely personal claim against the

secured party for the return of equivalent property when the debt is
paid off.94
91. As to redemption under the common law of pledge, see RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY
§§ 37, 54, 55 (1941), and JOSEPH STORY, BAILMENTS § 345 (9th ed. 1878). As to redemption
under pre-UCC personal property security statutes, see 2 GILMORE, supra note 12, § 44.2, at
1216-17.
92. See F. §§ 9-506 (right of redemption and permitted waiver), 9-501(3)(d)
(nonvariability); R. §§ 9-623 (right of redemption), 9-602(11), 9-624(c) (nonvariability and
permitted waiver). Unlike Former Article 9, the revision prohibits even post-default waiver of
the right in a consumer-goods transactions, per Revised 9-624(c). Revised 9-623 extends the
right to redeem to holders of nonconsensual liens (in addition to holders of Article 9 security
interests, who had that right under Former Article 9).
93. The principal provisions relating to nonvariability are cited in the preceding footnote.
An obscure provision of Former Article 9, Former 9-112, gives certain rights to a person who
owns the collateral but is not the "debtor" (where "debtor" in this context evidently must be
understood to refer to the obligor of the secured obligation), if the secured party knows of such
person's ownership of the collateral. Among other things, Former 9-112 states that the owner
has the same right as the "debtor" to redeem the collateral, "[u]nless otherwise agreed." This
provision thus seemingly permits pre-default waiver of the right, at least in this one narrow
instance. However, little significance should be attached to this ill-drafted provision. The
evident purpose of Former 9-112 was to limit the secured party's duties to such owner to
circumstances in which the secured party knows of such person's ownership. Revised Article 9
deals with the subject of non-obligor owners clearly and directly, and does not carry forward
Former 9-112. See R. §§ 9-102(a)(28) & cmt. 2.a, 9-605, 9-628.
94. See R. §§ 9-207 cmts. 5-6, 9-314 cmt. 3, 9-623 cmt. 4.
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At first sight this might seem a radical reinterpretation of the
concept of redemption. If applied to collateral generally, it would not
be easy to square with the secured party's nonwaivable duty to care
for collateral in its possession. 95 If as a general matter the debtor's
redemption right is, or can be, rendered purely personal, one could
argue that the debtor might just as well have the power to allow the
secured party to put a match to the collateral, so long as the secured
party agrees to return equivalent property in the future. Indeed, it is
tempting to conceive of the debtor's right to redeem collateral in rem
as not being a distinct "right" at all, but rather as a necessary
predicate to defining a relationship as being a secured transaction in
the first place. 96 A purely personal redemption right obviously is not
consistent with that conception.
These Comments refer to redemption as being a purely personal
claim only in the context of repledge and sale of pledged securities,
however, and not as a general proposition. In so doing, these
Comments merely state openly a point that has always been implicit
in the traditional view of repledge. Once it is conceded that SP may
make an "impairing" repledge of the collateral (whether by virtue of
Pledgor's consent or the new statutory gap-filling provision), SP has
the power to wipe out the value of Pledgor's property interest in the
collateral. To the extent that the value of Pledgor's property interest
is impaired by the repledge, it has always been the case that, as a
matter of substance, Pledgor's redemption right is a mere personal
claim against SP. So, while conceiving of Pledgor's redemption right
as a personal claim rather than as a property right may seem
anomalous-indeed it is anomalous-that anomaly is inherent in the
time-honored view that the Pledgor-SP relationship after an
"impairing" repledge remains a secured transaction.
It is also some comfort that Article 9 has always contemplated
situations besides repledge in which the relationship between debtor
and secured party continues to be a secured transaction even though
the debtor has no right to redeem the collateral. Such a situation
95. See R. § 9-207(a) (successor to F. § 9-207(1)) (prescribing duty of care as to collateral in
the secured party's possession); U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (duties of care prescribed by the UCC may
not be waived). As discussed supra note 7, this duty of care literally applies only to collateral in
the secured party's "possession," but it seems likely that this duty would also be held to apply to
security entitlements and uncertificated securities over which the secured party has control.
96. This thought has been forcefully expressed in connection with real estate mortgages.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES §§ 3.1, 6.4 (1997); 4 JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1193, at 569 (5th ed. 1941).
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arises if a non-consumer debtor signs a written waiver of its
redemption right after default. Another example arises if the secured
party after default makes a contract to dispose of the collateral. In
both situations the debtor's redemption right terminates, but the
relationship between debtor and secured party evidently still
continues to be a secured transaction until the secured party disposes
of the collateral or agrees to take it by way of strict foreclosure. 97
Indeed, under some pre-UCC security devices the debtor routinely
lost its redemption right after default or repossession, even absent a
98
waiver by the debtor or contract of sale by the secured party.
CONCLUSION: How I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE
REVISED ARTICLE 9

Repledge is a messy subject. The notion on which it rests-that
the relationship between a pledgor and secured party is a secured
transaction rather than a sale, despite the secured party's right to
separate the collateral from the debt-gives rise to irreducible
anomalies. When these anomalies are considered together with the
quite distinct metaphysical conundrums that arise when considering
property rights in securities held through securities intermediaries,
the result is a subject that will win no prize for tidiness.
To repeat, this messiness is not attributable to Revised Article 9
or the 1994 revisions to Article 8. Repledge was entrenched long
before the UCC was written, let alone these particular revision
projects, and the drafters had to play the cards they were dealt.
Indeed, were it not for the order imposed on the legal infrastructure
of the indirect holding system by the 1994 revisions to Article 8, the
anomalies posed by repledge would barely be visible. If the
accommodation of repledge in the UCC is reminiscent of a square
peg whose edges have been filed just enough to allow it be hammered
into a round hole, the blame should be placed on the judges of the
previous century, now all safely dead. De mortuis nil nisi bonum.

97. See R. §§ 9-623(c)(2), 9-624; F. § 9-506.
98. See, e.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. Haynes, 212 A.3d 436 (Me. 1965); UNIF. CONDITIONAL SALES
ACT §§ 17, 18 (withdrawn), 3B U.L.A. 584-85 (1992).

